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Current History

APRIL, 1960

FOR READING TODAY . . . FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

U.S. Military Policy and World Security

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Current History

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CAROL L. THOMPSON**

**Assistant Editor:
JOAN L. BARKON**

**Promotion Consultant:
MARY A. MEEHAN**

•
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University of Southern California

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Coming Next Month...

THE MIDDLE EAST: A PROGRESS REPORT

May, 1960

With the Middle East states still in a hostile and explosive mood, as recently evidenced by the flare-up on the Syrian-Israeli border, the May issue of CURRENT HISTORY provides invaluable background material on the factors that aggravate the situation there. In their analyses of the favorable and unfavorable conditions prevailing within each state and in its relations with its neighbors, the following six articles provide a "balance sheet" picture of the Middle East today:

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF OIL by *George Lenczowski*, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley, and author of *The Middle East in World Affairs*;

CENTERS OF CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST by *Benjamin Shadran*, editor of *Middle Eastern Affairs*;

THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC by *Halford L. Hoskins*, Senior Specialist in International Relations, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, and author of *The Middle East: Problem Area in World Politics*;

FOREIGN AID IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ITS IMPACT AND EFFECTS by *John Lindberg*, former chief of a U.N. Technical Assistance Mission to Libya and U.N. economic adviser to the Government of Jordan;

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN ISRAEL by *Dwight J. Simpson*, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Williams College, and currently on a lecture tour of Greece, Lebanon, Iran, India and Nepal for the U.S. Department of State;

ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN IRAN by *Robert J. Pranger*, Research Assistant, Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley.

ALSO COMING . . .

The United Nations Preserves World Security (June, 1960)

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Current History

Vol. 38

APRIL, 1960

No. 224

Our security and the security of the free world depend on a balance of military force hard to maintain in view of continuing Russian advances in space and missile research. What significance does the missile gap hold for the nation's security, and for our allies? The following seven articles describe and evaluate United States military policies to provide background information on continuing criticism of our defense program. The introductory article offers a careful summary of our programs and projects in space. It outlines the Administration's stand and the position of its critics, noting that "the United States is faced . . . with a challenge in space of supreme importance."

Challenge in Space

By ALLAN S. NANES

*Assistant to the Deputy Director, Legislative Reference Service,
Library of Congress*

ON OCTOBER 4, 1957, the Russians successfully launched the first *sputnik*. It was a shot that echoed around the world as loudly as any ever fired by Emerson's farmers at Concord bridge. Since that time space shots, Russian and American, have followed one another in bewildering profusion. The public appears confused by all this activity, and some would say it is apathetic. Yet there is abroad in the country a feeling both of wonder and unease, wonder at the immense technical advances which have brought man to the threshold of space, and unease at what appears to be a substantial Soviet lead in this field.

This fear points up the supreme political importance that space research has assumed. Of course, man's insatiable curiosity has been given a mighty impetus by policy considerations of the cold war. As a statement of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has put it,

The challenge and rewards of space research are such that the scientific prowess of the Na-

tion will be measured by its contributions in this field for many years to come. To apply less than our best effort consistent with our national capability represents an open invitation to other scientifically oriented nations to seize supremacy in the space-science field, and with it world leadership.¹

Or, as Dr. T. Keith Glennan, Administrator of the NASA has said, "I think the world today views leadership in technological and scientific fields as evidence of real strength in any nation."²

In pursuance of this political truism Russia has obviously given the highest priority to space research. On the other hand it has often been suggested that the United States was slow to recognize the political potentiailities in this field, and has never treated it

¹ U.S. Congress. House. Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration. *The Next Ten Years in Space*. Staff Report. House Document 115. 86th Congress, 1st session. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1959. p. 119.

² U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. *Governmental Organization for Space Activities*. Subcommittee on Governmental Organization for Space Activities. Report No. 806. 86th Congress, 1st Session. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1959. p. 5.

with the urgency the times demand. In addition, and with much justice, it has been widely alleged that America's objectives in its space program have never been adequately defined. Space research, after all, is intimately related to the race for missile weapons, particularly the intercontinental ballistic missile. This fact complicates our entire attack on the problems of space research, technically, administratively and financially. Those problems would be formidable enough in and of themselves, as a review of American progress in space to date will amply document.

First and foremost, because of its public impact, is the matter of satellite launchings and moon probes. The Russians have put up *Sputnik I*, with a scientific instrumentation payload of 184 pounds, and *Sputnik II*, with scientific instrumentation weighing 1,120 pounds. The instrumentation payload of *Sputnik III* was 2,925 pounds. Yet according to an NASA tabulation the total payload weight in orbit in each was closer to four tons.³ The Russians also launched a space probe at the beginning of 1959, and orbited a sphere of 3,245 pounds around the sun.

Then there was the spectacularly successful moon shot, *Lunik II*, which impacted on the moon on September 14, 1959, after a journey of 237,000 miles. Mr. Khrushchev lost no time in making political capital out of this triumph, for when he landed in America the next day he smilingly presented President Eisenhower with replicas of the markers the Soviet rocket had carried to the moon. He bade the United States send up a similar rocket, where its Soviet brother would be waiting to greet it. Finally, the Soviet Union sent up *Lunik III*, which circled the moon and sent back the first pictures of its hidden side. This satellite then went into orbit around the earth, and at the beginning of 1960 was still circling the heavens.

United States' Difficulties

Meanwhile, America's satellite and space programs were beset with difficulty from the beginning. Possibly as a result of undue haste induced by public alarm over Soviet space advances, and partly due to the imprecision of our space objectives mentioned above, American space vehicles seem to have

suffered more than their fair share of failures. But then American failures have taken place in the full glare of publicity, while any Soviet failures have been shrouded in secrecy.

There was the ill-starred *Vanguard*, developed by the Navy, whose first incarnation lost thrust after two seconds, and was consumed in flames. There were several other *Vanguard* failures, and several failures of the *Explorer* rocket, developed by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency. Even when we have been successful, as with *Explorer I*, which put the first American satellite into orbit on January 31, 1958, with *Explorers III* and *IV*, and with two *Vanguards*, the payloads we have been able to place in space have generally been minuscule compared to those launched by the Soviets. Thus *Explorer I* carried a total payload weight of 30.8 pounds, with scientific instrumentation therein weighing 18.13 pounds. When *Vanguard* finally orbited, its scientific payload and total weight in orbit came to 3.25 pounds.

Yet it would be misleading, and unfair to American workers in this field, to give the impression that Soviet space science has hopelessly outclassed our own. The United States has a number of space achievements to her credit which bespeak the skill and devotion of our researchers and technicians. For one thing, America is reputed to be superior in the miniaturization of equipment. For another, in the case of at least one American space shot, *Project Score*, in which President Eisenhower's voice was beamed from space, the total weight of the object placed in orbit was 8,750 pounds.⁴ In 1959, the United States placed nine earth satellites in orbit, of which five are still orbiting, and in addition two more are still in orbit which were placed there in 1958.⁵ Our first moon shot, *Pioneer I*, launched on October 11, 1958, soared over 70,000 statute miles, many times higher than any previous man-made object. *Pioneer IV*, launched March 3, 1959, is in orbit around the sun. *Explorer VI*, the "paddle wheel" satellite, has taken a television picture of the earth. *Project*

³ *United States and Russian Satellites, Lunar Probes and Space Probes 1957-58-59*. Official Statistics Prepared by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Washington, 1951. These figures, which are called unofficial, were culled from the U.S. press, *Pravda*, and Moscow radio.

⁴ *Ibid.* The object, however, was the rocket frame itself.

⁵ *New York Times*. December 27, 1959. Section 4. Page E 9.

Argus, by which we detonated small nuclear weapons 300 miles above the earth, was no doubt a scientific achievement of the first rank.

It would seem, then, that the prime technical problem the United States must solve if it is to draw abreast of, or surpass, the Soviet Union in space research, is to develop rockets with sufficient thrust to overcome the weight and distance advantage now held by the Soviets. This is certainly true if the overall political implications of space research are considered. Here again we encounter the problem of objectives, for there are some who would argue that from a purely military point of view it is more important to give priority to attacking the technical problems of defeating the ballistic missile, that is, developing the anti-missile missile.

The Saturn

United States hopes for the development of a rocket with the necessary thrust are now centered in the *Saturn*, a project originally assigned to the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, now taken over by the NASA. *Saturn* consists of a cluster of eight rocket engines or "boosters," similar to those already powering Thor and Jupiter IRBM's. It will develop 1.5 million pounds of thrust, about double what the Russians were said to have as of late 1958.⁶ The great lifting power of *Saturn* would exceed by 300 per cent that of any rocket now possessed by the United States. It would be capable of landing a ton of instruments on the moon, or putting several tons of payload in an orbit around the earth. Its power would permit the duplication of electrical systems, so that the failure of a small component would not cancel the success of the entire effort.⁷ But as of the time of writing the *Saturn* project was the object of considerable wrangling, and in need of renewed momentum. There are of course many other important space projects, but unfortunately there is no room to discuss them here.

However, even if we assume that *Saturn* is a success, and that we attain parity with the Russians in the matter of thrust, there are still many problems which need to be solved before either the Russians or ourselves can feel that we are masters of space. For one, there is the question of radiation activity.

Our *Explorer* satellites noted a belt of high-energy radiation extending upward from a height of a few hundred miles.⁸ This radiation intensity apparently increases several thousand times between 180 and 975 miles, with a rapid rise beginning at about 240 miles.⁹ The apparent dose rates would not interdict "low altitude" manned satellites, but any such vehicles orbiting at altitudes greater than 300 to 400 miles would require shielding, which would have to increase in weight up to about 1200 miles, the highest altitude for which there is fairly reliable information.¹⁰

Another problem, and certainly one of outstanding importance, is that of recovery of any capsule or nose cone returning from space. Certainly if *Project Mercury*, the much heralded plan to launch a man into space, is to be successful, a greater reliability must be imparted to recovery techniques. True, monkeys have been shot into space and recovered alive. On the other hand, at least seven attempts to recover a capsule in our *Discoverer* series of shots have gone awry. Presumably continuing experimentation will go forward to perfect recovery procedures.

There are, of course, innumerable technical problems which arise in any given space project, and no attempt can be made to detail them here. It has been suggested, however, that applied research to advance the state of the arts in space-vehicular technology is largely neglected.¹¹ But the solution of these technical problems depends to a considerable degree on the effort put into that solution, which in turn largely depends on the administrative and financial context, to a discussion of which we will now turn.

Administration and Financing

Prior to the initiation of space programs as such, the United States was already engaged in the development of various missiles. Each one of the services had its own missile

⁶ *Wall Street Journal*, November 18, 1959, p. 1.

⁷ Herron, E. A. "Saturn: The Big One." *Skyline*. North American Aviation. Vol. 17. No. 4. Fall, 1959, p. 23.

⁸ Buchheim, Robert W. and the Staff of the Rand Corporation. *Space Handbook: Astronautics and Its Applications*. New York. Random House. 1959. p. 24.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ U.S. Congress. House. Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration. *The Next Ten Years in Space. Op. Cit.* Statement of George L. Haller, Vice-President of General Electric, p. 72.

program, and the resultant rivalry called forth a great deal of criticism. More than once the cry was heard that what was needed was a "missile czar," that there should be over-all direction of the missile program under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense. In March, 1956, Secretary Charles Wilson actually appointed a Special Assistant in Guided Missiles, "thus recreating a post he had abolished three years earlier."¹² But coordination into one over-all missile program was never really effected, and inter-service rivalry continued to cloud the missile picture. Secretary Wilson then issued a directive, in 1957, confining the Army to short-range (up to 200 miles) missiles, while vesting control of longer-range missile development in the Air Force.

Before the consequences of this directive could take much effect the Russians launched *Sputnik I*, and the United States felt itself under extreme pressure to do something to regain its lost prestige. The *Vanguard*, which was being readied by the Navy to launch a satellite as part of the International Geophysical Year program, was rushed to the launching pad where it failed not once, but twice. Fortunately the IGY effort was spared further embarrassment when the Army Ballistic Missile Agency successfully launched a satellite, using a *Jupiter C* rocket as the vehicle.

Now over-all coordination of the IGY program was in the hands of the National Academy of Sciences. But with the storm raised by *sputnik* it was a foregone conclusion that America's space effort would be taken out of the leisurely realm of scientific exploration and be given a priority that its political importance demanded. Indeed, the Army's success in putting up the satellite with a rocket in which the *Redstone* missile served as the first stage, pointed up anew the interdependence of missile development and space research. Furthermore, it projected the Army into the forefront of the space program, and in so doing largely set aside the Wilson directive.

The ensuing administrative charging and counter-charging, organization and reorganization is so complex that it would take the proverbial Philadelphia lawyer to unravel it, and in truth, it is still going on. What follows is an attempt to outline the more im-

portant organizational moves, both as initiated by Congress and the Executive.¹³

Organization and Reorganization

First, on November 7, 1957, the President announced that he had set up a new office, that of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. That post went to Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., the president of M.I.T. Dr. Killian's duties were somewhat vague, but presumably his prime responsibility was to keep an eye on the progress of the missile and space programs. Only eight days after the President's announcement, the Secretary of Defense abolished the post of Special Assistant for Guided Missiles, and established instead the post of Director of Guided Missiles. Mr. William M. Holaday, who had been filling the former position, was appointed to the latter. In his new capacity he would presumably have more authority, and would be in a position to coordinate the missile effort. Nevertheless there remained a good deal of scepticism as to whether the change in Mr. Holaday's position was any more than titular.

Before there was a chance to find out, several new agencies entered the picture, and the office of Director of Guided Missiles receded into the background, eventually to be abolished. These new agencies reflected concern "with the seemingly limitless and uncharted military potential of space."¹⁴ To give that concern concrete form Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy, early in 1958, established the Advanced Research Projects Agency by administrative order. There was some question as to the Secretary's legal authority to undertake this action, but the Defense Department argued he was so empowered under the National Security Act of 1947. In the end Congress ratified the Secretary's action.

ARPA was to be a small agency within the Department of Defense, but above the level of the three military services. In this way it could sponsor research in weaponry and space projects of potential military value,

¹² Gibney, Frank. "The Missile Mess." Harper's. January 1960, p. 40. Quoting report of Military Affairs Subcommittee of House Committee on Government Operations.

¹³ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. *Organization and Management of Missile Programs*. Military Operations Subcommittee, Report No. 1121. 86th Congress. 1st session. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1959. p. 18.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

while remaining free of immediate requirements and interservice rivalries.

But the role of ARPA was clouded almost immediately by the passage of two acts of Congress, each designed to increase the efficiency of the space and missile programs. These acts were the National Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 and the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. The former established the post of Director of Defense Research and Engineering while abolishing that of Assistant Secretary of Defense in those categories. The latter set up the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

The Defense Reorganization Act vests the Director of Defense Research and Engineering with the power to supervise all such activities conducted by the Department of Defense. That renders this official, Dr. Herbert F. York, the nominal superior of the director of ARPA. Regardless of the discretion with which Dr. York may exercise his powers, the concept of ARPA as the director and coordinator of advanced research within the Department of Defense cannot fail to be questioned.

The creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration raised further problems. The theory behind the reorganization of the Defense Department had been that final responsibility for the missile effort was to be centered in the Secretary of Defense, or in those directly responsible to him. The creation of NASA recognized a civilian role in space, and immediately raised the spectre of jurisdictional conflict.

The National Aeronautics and Space Act attempts to head off this problem. In establishing NASA, it nevertheless provides that "activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems. . . shall be directed by the Department of Defense."¹⁵ It also created a National Aeronautics and Space Council, consisting of the President, the secretaries of State and Defense, the administrator of NASA, the chairman of the AEC, one other government member, and three members from private life. The duties of this council are to advise the President concerning the responsibilities vested in him under the act, among which is the promotion of cooperation between NASA and the Department of Defense.

Finally the act established a Civilian-Military Liaison Committee, consisting of representatives of the Pentagon and NASA, with the primary purpose of resolving questions of jurisdiction.

Despite these elaborate safeguards, jurisdictional problems were not long in arising. NASA, on the sound ground that it was unnecessary and uneconomic to duplicate facilities already in existence, sought to acquire the Army's Jet Propulsion Laboratory at Pasadena, as well as the Ballistic Missile Agency at Huntsville, Alabama. The Army, as was to be expected, fought hard to retain control of these facilities. The upshot was a typical compromise, with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory going over to NASA control, although certain Army contracts for the development of the *Sergeant* missile were to remain in force, while the Army retained control of its Ballistic Missile Agency. However the Army agreed to consider the needs of NASA, and work on some of its projects. This compromise, like so many others, was destined to last only a short time, and in the autumn of 1959 the ABMA was finally transferred to the Space Administration. However, by the time this transfer was effected, the law required its approval by Congress. Thus the President forwarded his plan for the transfer to Congress on January 14, 1960, the same day that he sent another message calling for changes in our organization for space research. The transfer plan must lie before Congress for 60 days, and if not rejected within that period, it will have taken effect on March 14. Finally, with the establishment of NASA, certain space projects not primarily military in nature were transferred from the Advanced Research Projects Agency and hence from the Department of Defense.

As 1960 opened there remained a great deal of dissatisfaction with the administration of our space programs, and there were strong intimations of further impending changes. These intimations became reality early in the new session of Congress, with the President's special message on the subject. In that message he called for the abolition of the National Aeronautics and Space Council and the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee. These changes had been an-

¹⁵ *Ibid.* Quoting public law 85-568, section 102(b).

ticipated, for the Space Council met infrequently, and the military had complained of underrepresentation, while the Liaison Committee, in the words of the President's message, had "no other duties than providing a channel of advice and consultation between NASA and the Department of Defense."¹⁸

The President's plan was obviously designed to strengthen NASA as an independent operating agency. It was based on the premise that the nation should have a military and a non-military space program, operating side by side. This decision was foreshadowed in the President's state of the union message, when he said that space exploration, "is often mistakenly supposed to be an integral part of defense."¹⁷ In his message on reorganizing the space programs he made this specific, saying that there must be an "elimination of those provisions which reflect the concept of a single program embracing military as well as non-military space activities."¹⁸

On this point the President and many of his critics take diametrically opposite points of view. The critics see space and missile activities as so intimately linked, that any attempt to separate them is only bound to hamper both. They argue that under current conditions it is unrealistic in the extreme not to view space and missile programs as different sides of the same coin, that coin being the technological prestige of the United States, and the very real political consequences contingent upon it. As Gibney puts

it, "The same principles govern space and missile firing. The same discoveries are vital to both."¹⁹ In the view of this group the United States needs a single space-missile program, with unified coordination and direction. Beyond that some would argue that the space-missile era renders obsolete our basic concepts of military organization. Certainly believers in these schools are not satisfied by the President's new directive.

Space and the Budget Balance

We turn finally to the question that is basic to space research, as it is to every public issue, the question of money. The administration, as we know, is committed to a philosophy of economy, of a balanced budget. It views the threat posed by national insolvency as equal in danger to that posed by *Sputnik*, *Lunik* and their successors. As a result, the administration has not asked for the sums that many, inside and outside of Congress, believe are necessary if the United States is not to fall hopelessly behind in the space-missile race. It is this philosophy, at least in part, that has led a number of public figures to question whether the United States has the sense of urgency, the purposeful drive, to compete with Russia in this instance. The President's request for \$800 million for the coming fiscal year, as compared to the \$500 million appropriated for the current year, indicates that the administration does not propose a drastic change in its approach, which it believes best serves the national interest.

Finally, it might be noted that the organizational and fiscal problems of space and missile development are as intimately connected as the technical ones. Thus the interservice rivalry in missiles, particularly ICBM's, was carried on at enormous cost to the American taxpayer. The cry is sure to be raised that military and non-military space programs, operating simultaneously, are wasteful, regardless of differences in mission. Furthermore some, including Dr. Von Braun, have argued that funding a program

(Continued on page 204)

Allan S. Nanes, an international relations specialist, has taught at Brooklyn College, Hunter College and Hofstra College. Formerly with the United States State Department, he has worked for the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress for four years, making studies and writing reports and speeches for various members of Congress. He obtained his background in the field of comparative military strength working with the staff of the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament. Mr. Nanes has authored or co-authored articles in various scholarly journals.

¹⁸ Washington Star. January 14, 1960, pp. A1 and A6.

¹⁷ N. Y. Times, January 10, 1960. Section 4, p. E1.

¹⁹ Washington Star, op. cit. p. A6.

²⁰ Gibney, Frank. "The Missile Mess," Harper's, op. cit. p. 44.

According to this well known economist, "though the tax capacity is adequate, the government seems interested only in keeping taxes down, expenditures low and the repayment of debt a primary aim." Asking for a more effective policy for national growth, he warns: "That security is more important than finance escapes the administration."

Military Security or a Balanced Budget?

By SEYMOUR HARRIS

Professor of Economics, Harvard University

UNFORTUNATELY in the modern world expenditures for defense have to be large. They amount to about 10 per cent of the nation's gross national product. That our efforts may not be adequate is suggested by the fact that the Russians with 40 per cent of our G.N.P. spend almost as much for military purposes as this country does; and with their concentration on essentials, not embellishments, low pay for personnel, and so forth, their military dollar goes much farther than ours.

Expenditures of the federal government have steadily increased, especially in war times. From 1790 to 1916, of \$651 million of federal expenditures war and related items accounted for only \$285 million, or 17 per cent. But from 1917 on, of total expenditures of \$154 billion, \$131 billion or 85 per cent, relate to war. See Table I (page following).

The more recent history is seen in Table II (page following). Our spending has changed since the nineteenth century. War and related expenditures have loomed very large in our total federal budget. Here there is a break with the early nineteenth century, but not so clear a break with the period after the Civil War. The 1961 budget includes roughly \$63 billion for war and related expenditures inclusive of veterans' benefits, interest on the debt, and international finance. But it should be noted that there are also about \$15 billion for labor and welfare, agriculture and agricultural resources, natural resources, and commerce and housing. These \$15 billion should be compared with a total

budget of about \$1 billion in 1913. It is clear that the welfare function of government has greatly increased. War and the Great Depression have had a substantial effect upon the spending pattern of the government.

The President's View of the Budget

As early as 1952, Candidate Eisenhower harped upon the need of getting the budget down. On November 1, 1952, he said:

I pledge an elimination of waste, inefficiency and duplication in government. Expenditures, and consequently taxes, are too high. We must take steps that would make a reduction possible. One such step we can take immediately. We can eliminate waste and extravagance in government and give our people a dollar's service for each tax dollar received.

Time and again the President and his advisers warned the country of impending

Chairman of the Harvard Department of Economics, Seymour E. Harris has been a member of the faculty since 1922. He is the editor of *The Review of Economics and Statistics* and the author of 25 books on economics, including *Economics of New England*. A consultant to government agencies many times, Mr. Harris testified, in March, 1957, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Disarmament on economic aspects of disarmament.

TABLE I. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, 1800-1945
(Millions of dollars)

	Total	War Department	Navy	Interest on Public Debt	Other Expenditures
1945	100,404	50,490	30,047	3,616	16,250
1900	520	135	55.9	40.2	290
1850	39,543	9,400	7,905	3,782	18,456
1800	11	2.6	3.5	3.4	1.4

Source: *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945*, pp. 300-301.

TABLE II. BUDGET EXPENDITURES

Millions of dollars

	1951	Estimate for 1960	1961
Major national security	22,444	45,805	45.6
International affairs & finance	3,736	2,129	2.2
Veterans services and benefits	5,342	5,088	5.5
Labor and welfare	2,065	4,129	4.6
Agriculture and agricultural resources	650	5,996	5.6
Natural resources	1,267	1,710	1.9
Commerce and housing	2,217	2,243	2.7
General government	1,327	1,735	1.9
Interest on national debt	5,714	8,096	9.6
Total budget expenditures	44,058	77,030	79.8
Budget surplus or deficit	+ 3,510	+ 70	4.2

Source: *The Budget for the Fiscal Year 1960*, pp. 1013-1014; *1961 Federal Budget in Brief*, pp. 7, 16.

bankruptcy unless expenditures were kept down. For example, in 1954 Vice-President Nixon said of the Democrats that: "they know that this [the Democratic military program] would force us into bankruptcy, that we would destroy our freedom in attempting to defend it." (Is this a reckless charge?)

Bankruptcy?

In his budget address, the President said: "We cannot afford to build military strength by sacrificing economic strength." Secretary Humphrey and key Republican congressmen have made similar statements. It is also evident from testimony of General Bradley and General Ridgway and statements by former Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter and the military strategist Hanson Baldwin that non-military considerations played an excessive part in the determination of military policy. In his 1956 campaign Governor Stevenson wisely stressed the priority of security over finance.

What is meant here by bankruptcy? Surely a sovereign power can always pay its bills. Surely the great expansion of our G.N.P. from \$100 billion in 1929 to \$500 billion currently does not point to bankruptcy.

Is it the heavy tax load that spells bankruptcy for the present Administration? On this score note that at the time of fears of impending bankruptcy taxes accounted for 26 per cent of our gross product as compared with 33½, 34 and 31½ per cent for the United Kingdom, Germany and France. Yet per capita income in the United States was almost three times that of the United Kingdom and France and four times that of Germany. Surely the tax burden, however annoying, considered relative to per capita income is not bankrupting us. The vast gains of income belie that position.

Is the rise of the national debt the sign of bankruptcy? But whereas the national debt amounted to 124 per cent of G.N.P. in 1946, it is estimated at 56 per cent of the G.N.P.

in 1960. Rising productivity and inflation have greatly cut the burden of the national debt.

Yet such fears of impending disaster, belied by the steady rise of our income (an average increase of 4 per cent a year in 10 years), helped induce the government to cut its military budget by \$10 billion in 1954 and from fiscal year 1953 to 1960 to cut the ratio of defense outlays to G.N.P. (corrected for price changes) by 40 per cent—even as our military position was deteriorating.

Yet in Los Angeles on October 10, 1952, the President had said:

... Only a strong and free America, actually cooperating with the free world, can give substance to the hope of a lasting peace . . . We must first bring about a position of strength that will persuade the Kremlin that further military aggression anywhere is senseless.

In Baltimore on September 25, 1952, the candidate said:

But the big spending is, of course, the \$60 billion we pay for national security. Here is where the largest savings can be made. And these savings must be made without reduction of defensive power. That is exactly what I am now proposing. To accomplish this will require the help of civilian leaders—business, labor, and professional—who really know their jobs.

Then he went on to criticize the Truman policy of stop and start spending, of feast and famine in military expenditures; the delay in putting up bases in Morocco and therefore introduction of a costly crash program; the purchase of 20,000 super de luxe desk chairs at \$10 above the standard model price, and similar wastes.

At Cincinnati on September 22, 1952, the candidate said: "The American people need a government that knows enough about arms and armies to work out the most defense, at less cost with the least delay."

Under the leadership of the President, Secretary Humphrey, Secretary of Defense Wilson, and Budget Director Dodge large cuts were made in the military budget in 1953 to 1955. Even in 1959 when asked by a reporter at a press conference whether it was not true that the Administration "put a balanced budget ahead of national security," the President replied:

But I do not—I'm just tired even of talking about the idea of a balanced budget against na-

tional security—I don't see where this thing ever comes into it.

I say that a balanced budget in the long run is a vital part of national security.

Then he went on to discuss the danger of continued increases in defense expenditures.

"... Everybody with any sense knows that we are finally going to a garrison state."

Not only in the early years of his Administration, but later the President apparently was being pressured by his business advisers to cut the defense budget. He tried to resist as best he could. Even in 1957 in a public broadcast the President said:

... I earnestly believe that this defense budget represents, in today's world, the proper dividing line between national danger on the one hand and excessive expenditures on the other. If it is materially cut, I believe the country would be taking a needless gamble. For myself I have seen unwise military cuts before. I have more than once seen the terrible consequences. I am determined to do all I can to see that we do not follow that foolhardy road again.

Even as he was making this address it seems that the Secretary of Defense was informing congressional leaders that the Department could get along with less for military needs than the Congress was willing to give.

One of the most surprising aspects of the large cuts in 1953 was that the chiefs of staff were not even consulted. Defense Secretary Wilson on May 20, 1953, spoke as follows:

When I came back [from a Nato conference] I found some figures [on a proposed defense cut]. I went over them quickly—after we got the things together we added them up. Much to [my] surprise . . . most of the cuts somehow seemed to show up in the Air Force Program.

A Budget Bureau letter to Defense Secretary Wilson of May 7, 1953, advised Wilson that his first Defense Budget did not meet "the Administration's . . . budget objectives" and curtly told him that he was "expected to adjust your recommendations accordingly." General Ridgway, who served as Army Chief of Staff under the Eisenhower administration, revealed that the first three Eisenhower Defense Budgets "were not primarily based on military needs. They were squeezed within the framework of pre-set arbitrary manpower and fiscal limits. . . ."

In 1954, Defense Secretary Wilson said:

They provide a level of military strength

which can be supported by the country, not only for the next few years, but for as long as may be necessary. . . . The cost of national security must be bearable. . . . Over the long pull economic strength is an indispensable prerequisite for military strength.

This is a typical statement of businessmen in the administration and even of some generals indoctrinated with principles that apply in business but not in government.

Incidentally the point may be made that in the kind of war we are likely to be in, that is, an atomic war, there should be less rather than more reliance on the economic strength of the country. By this I mean that what really counts in this war is how much military mobilization we have at the time the war starts, rather than the potential for armament and mobilization, because time for further mobilization will not be available. Failure to understand this is one of the great errors of policy since 1952.

Again, Army Chief of Staff Ridgway told the House Appropriations Committee in 1954: "The Army has been guided in the preparation of this budget by basic economic and strategic decisions which have been made at a higher level." Hanson Baldwin, the *New York Times* military analyst, said: "There is no doubt that reduction of costs was a major factor—probably the major factor in the new program." Secretary of the Treasury and the Budget Director had more influence in shaping the overall sizes of the services than did the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Walter Lippmann had this to say early in 1959:

The fatal error lies in the decision of the President to make the paramount issue of the present time a Federal Budget balanced at the existing level of taxes, along with a promise of a reduction of taxes before the next Presidential election. We are approaching one of the great climaxes of the cold war and the President's decision about the paramountcy of the budget reflects a failure to understand the nature of the cold war.

It makes suspect all the military estimates in the budget. For it is no part of the law of the land, or of that moral law which the President frequently invokes, that the existing tax structure cannot be raised and should be lowered. To insist on such a dogma about taxes is to tell the people and the world that national defense is not the first but only the secondary consideration in this government.

The Advisory Council of the Democratic National Committee summarized the influence of businessmen on our military program as follows:

In the same way, and for similar reasons, the Administration allowed itself to be outdistanced by the Russians in our races to perfect both an intermediate and an intercontinental missile. Success in those races involved the expenditure of large sums of money, and the Administration was a prisoner, as any Republican Administration must be, of the big business belief that nothing can be done which interferes with the balancing of the budget at a low level. The world of big business has no faith in the power of democratic institutions to inspire and direct the growth of national productivity, as they have done again and again in our history.

Thomas Finletter, the ex-Secretary of Air; shows very well what happened during these years.

Look at the difference in our whole power position and our security between, say, January, 1951, and January 1959. In January, 1951, no nation on earth dared risk general war with the United States. Communist Chinese might take the chance—under very strong provocation—of fighting us in a war which we had labeled as a limited war. The American supremacy in air-atomics was a sure guarantee in 1951 against Russia or China, deliberately starting a general war, or pushing their cold war, or limited war too far.

But in January, 1959, we are facing the so-called "missile gap" when the Russians will have superiority over us in air-atomics—possibly enough of a superiority to allow them to strike first and to accept our counter blow. . . .

Mr. Finletter also points to an Air Force budget of \$22.4 billion in 1952 which dropped to \$11.4 billion in fiscal year 1954 and rose to \$17 billion in 1959.

Our Security Position

Our security position has certainly deteriorated since 1953. Our responsibilities have been large and varied. We have not matched these responsibilities with an adequate security position. General Ridgway told the Senate Appropriations Hearings in 1954:

. . . You're steadily reducing Army forces—the reduction through which our capabilities will be lowered while our responsibilities for meeting the continuing enemy threats have yet to be correspondingly lessened.

He also told the House Appropriations Committee:

. . . the military power ratio between western defense capability and the Soviet bloc's capability is not changing to our advantage—the strength of the major components of Soviet bloc military power continues to increase—unaccompanied by an offsetting increase in Allied strength.

Admiral Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, in reply to a question concerning our commitments said:

"I should say we are deeply involved everywhere outside the Soviet orbit. . . . Our commitment is around the world." He added that our forces are not adequate to fulfill this commitment.

In accordance with the Secretary of State's announcement of a policy of massive retaliation one might well have expected an increase in expenditures for the Air Force, and also a decisive program to develop the ICBM, and also in general improve our atomic position. Yet even as the massive retaliation program was announced, the government cut decisively our military expenditures, particularly for our Air Force. As we lost position vis-à-vis the Russians and the Communists generally, we were put in the position of being able to fight only an atomic war and being virtually incapable of fighting other kinds of war—for our manpower strength was greatly cut. Modern war with nuclear war heads on ballistic rockets of inter-continental range raises almost insuperable problems for the United States at the present time, especially in view of the fact that we are way behind the Russians.

In a talk before the National Press Club on January 15, 1959, all the President could say about our missile program is that we had worked hard at it for four years and other countries had been at it much longer. He also said that we must not judge our whole defense effort by the missile program. After all we have planes traveling at double the speed of sound.

Even as our international position deteriorated, the President had in his 1955 Budget provided for a 14 per cent cut in the number of divisions, 22 per cent in manpower, and 41 per cent in expenditures for the army. For the Navy, the reduction was to be 14 per cent in manpower and 16 per cent in expendi-

tures. For the Air Force expenditures were to decline 7 per cent, and research and development, 30.4 per cent.

In fact, one of the most disturbing aspects of the President's program was the reduction of research outlays. Apparently, research had very little attraction for Secretary Wilson. In February, 1957, Wilson expressed preference for direct research over pure research and made clear his impatience with pure research.

General Ridgway revealed that the military budget "was not based so much on military requirements, or on what the economy of the country could stand, as on political considerations." He accused Wilson, in effect, "of warning him not to oppose the President's wishes and of forcing a 'directed verdict' on the joint chiefs in the matter of the size of the Armed Forces."

Samuel Huntington, a very able observer, in an unpublished paper of 1956, said:

If either side had an advantage in 1952, it was the United States and its allies. In three years, this situation has radically changed. The policies of the Eisenhower Administration have eroded American military strength. American capability to fight a limited war has been drastically reduced. . . . Military effectiveness has been undermined by shortened training, lowered standards, deferred maintenance, and reduced civilian employment in the defense department. . . . In quantity and quality the Russian Air Force is becoming superior to our own. For three years, American forces have been cut back, while Russian sea and air forces have been steadily expanded.

The 1960 Outlook

It is not surprising then that Walter Lippmann on January 22, 1960, in discussing the President's various messages of 1960, raised doubts about the security of the nation. Lippmann wondered whether we could safely concentrate on private activities as the President suggested. Lippmann was critical of the President "because he does not distinguish between private prosperity measured in the total production of goods and services for private use, and national power which is measured not only in terms of armaments but also in terms of wealth directed to education, to public health. . . ."

The President and his party want to keep budgetary expenditures down. They are

more interested in paying off the debt than they are in making the country strong enough to assure the strong Russians that an attack would be as disastrous for them as it would be for us.

Despite the statements on our ability adequately to finance our security by the National Planning Association, the Gaither Report and the Rockefeller brothers' report, the President and his business advisers see only the dollar costs. They do not weigh dollar security outlays of \$10 billion additional against the tens of millions of lives involved, our trillion dollars of wealth, and the \$500 billion of current income.

What Are the Issues?

They do not even seem to realize that the expenditures of the federal government should be related to the size of our economy. Indeed they have not kept expenditures down to the promised \$60 billion. But members of the Administration do not seem to be aware that they have cut the federal budget from 21 to 16 per cent of the gross national product.

Anxious to give the taxpayer a break, their tax reduction program of 1954 now costs the Treasury \$10 billion a year. Would it not have been wiser to have retained these taxes and spent the \$10 billion on defense each year? Even the taxpayers cheered by bigger and uglier cars, more television sets, travel, cosmetics, gambling, and so forth made available by the tax cuts would, in the long run, have been much better off with a more adequate missile and space program.

Nor has the Administration acted wisely in defense-related activities. The President proposed a \$100 billion road construction program. Instead Congress gave him a \$40 billion program, presumably to aid defense. Though this theory of defense—facilities for escaping atomic attack—is outmoded, the expenditures continue. And though the President has assured the nation that education is even more important than missiles, he could give the country only a billion dollars over 4 years—and these are spent with great hesitation. He vetoed a housing bill in 1959 among other reasons because it offered \$50 million worth of loans for academic buildings.

In short, though the tax capacity is adequate, the government seems interested only in keeping taxes down, expenditures low, and the repayment of debt a primary aim. That security is more important than finance escapes the administration. Of what significance would the size of the debt, or the price level be if the Russians decide that they can launch an attack with relative impunity? Businessmen by instinct oppose taxes and basic research and public expenditures. Their views on the big issues are likely to be myopic. The principles that apply to business, cost cutting, delays to save resources, may be carried too far in defense. We can criticize the government for not spending enough for defense. In addition a more effective policy for growth instead of excessive concern for price stability could easily have provided \$10 billion a year more for defense without raising tax rates.

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over a longer period of time often increases expenses in the end, and may result in an obsolescent vehicle to boot.²⁰ This point will certainly be urged by those who want larger spending on the space effort.

The United States is faced, then, with a challenge in space of supreme importance. The Soviet Union has made it clear, by testing a new rocket over a Pacific range, a rocket supposedly designed to launch heavy earth satellites and undertake space flights to planets of the solar system, that she has

no intention of standing still in the race for space. Perhaps the United States can catch up. Dr. Glennan has said that "five years from now we won't be taking a back seat."²¹ In order to attain equality with the Russians, however, if not supremacy, we must give top priority to the space-missile program. To do less may bring consequences to the United States and the free world which are most unpleasant.

²⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 42-43.

²¹ *Washington Star*. December 29, 1959, p. 1.

"The draft, the levee en masse conscription or selective service, . . . was born out of the needs of the mass army, . . . but with technological war affecting entire populations, men, women and children, lotteries, good intentions, the good citizen, are not enough," writes this specialist experienced in the administration of selective service. "They may even prove fatal," he warns, "if our manpower plans call for outmoded wars and for manpower with the limits of firepower of the past. . . ."

The Volunteer and the Conscript in American Military History

By EDWARD A. FITZPATRICK

*Advisor and Consultant on Manpower, Industrial College
of the Armed Forces*

THE FIRST formulation of American military policy in its broad outlines is in the constitution of the United States, and this basic policy has not been changed at all in the constitution in the one hundred and seventy years of American history. However, the implementation of the policy has become so different—even revolutionary—that in the jargon of the day all similarity is purely coincidental.

The constitutional military policy aim in the language of the Preamble is “to insure domestic tranquility, to provide for the common defence” and we should add as not un-

related, “to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” The essential element in the policy was the militia. The power to declare war was vested in the Congress, as was the right—denied to the states—to raise and support armies, and to raise and maintain a navy. The general fear of a standing army is expressed in the limitation on the power to support armies: no appropriation of money to their use shall be for a longer term than two years. The states were specifically prohibited from keeping “troops and ships of war in time of peace.” “Troops” in this sentence obviously did not include the “militia.” The rules and regulations for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces were to be made by Congress. The purse strings were also in Congress’ hands, for the power to lay and collect taxes, duties and imposts . . . for the common defence was vested in Congress. Thus was the principle of the civilian control of the military spelled out, and further indicated by declaring the civilian President the “Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the Militia of the United States, when called into the actual service of the United States.”

The central place of the militia, which were primarily state troops, is indicated in its use by the nation. The Congress was given power

To provide for calling the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions. (I-8-15)

Edward A. Fitzpatrick is president emeritus of Mount Mary College for Women, Milwaukee. Since 1946 he has been a member of the advisory board of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He was on active duty in the Office of the Director of Selective Service from 1942 to 1945; since 1945 he has served as advisor to the U.S. Director of Selective Service. Mr. Fitzpatrick has edited General Hershey's three volume report on *Selective Service in Peacetime*, *Selective Service in Wartime*, and *Selective Service as the Tide of War Turns*. His books include *Conscription and America* and *Universal Military Training*. He is editor of the *Catholic School Journal*.

and that the militia was conceived as the main reliance of the framers of the constitution is indicated in this further duty of the Congress:

To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia, for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of Training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.¹

The Bill of Rights Safeguards. The bill of rights passed two years after the new government was organized under the constitution contained two amendments emphasizing the place of the militia and the fear of standing armies. The Second Amendment declared: a "well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state," Congress was forbidden to infringe on the right of the people to keep and bear arms. The Third Amendment forbade the quartering of soldiers in peacetime in any house without the consent of the owner and required that in time of war, it be in a manner prescribed by law.

The only other pertinent factor is the simple definition of treason, differing from the seven forms of high treason in the basic law of England (1351). It consisted only "in levying war against the United States, or adhering to their enemies giving them Aid and Comfort."

The Declaration of Independence. In the background we must keep in mind the list in the declaration of independence of the repeated injuries and usurpations of King George III and his government, whose direct object was the establishment of an absolute tyranny over the colonies:

1. He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies, without the consent of our legislatures.
2. He has affected to render the military independent of, and superior to, the civil power.
3. He has quartered large bodies of armed troops among us.
4. He is at this time transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to complete the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstance of cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy of the head of a civilized nation.

The Federalist. The climate of opinion in which this basic policy was formulated and defended was expressed by Hamilton in the seven Federalist papers (Nos. 23-29) he wrote on the standing army, the militia and the common defence. A dominant thought in the public opinion in opposition to the constitution was the danger to liberty of standing armies in peacetime. This feeling Hamilton noted was derived from the English and he tells the story of the British struggle to transfer control of the army to the parliament from the monarch, which was finally successful in the Bill of Rights of 1688.²

Hamilton argued that having transferred the control to Congress—the safest repository of such power, there was no point in restricting the power to *raise* armies because of the exigencies of national experience, the history of war, and the need to provide for the common defence. The main reliance was to be on the militia, but as Hamilton noted, the Revolution itself could not have been successful even with the "eternal monuments of fame" credited to the valor of the militia without the support of an army, i.e., well-organized, trained and disciplined troops. The *keeping of*, rather than the *raising of* an army was the more critical issue and the support of it for only two years, requiring biennial review of the situation, was regarded a sufficient safeguard, particularly in view of the popular election of the House of Representatives every two years and a selection of one-third of the Senate.

Without going into Hamilton's argument in detail, the spirit of the time and of his discussion can be best illustrated in two quotations from the Federalist Paper (No. 29).

If a well-regulated militia be the most natural defence of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is constituted the guardian of

¹ In the documents ratifying the constitution, four States protested against keeping a standing army and related subjects. New Hampshire wanted a provision that a standing army should not be kept without the consent of three-fourths of both houses of Congress, and North Carolina said it should be two-thirds; New Hampshire also wanted a provision of no quartering of soldiers in private homes in peacetime without the consent of the owner; New York wanted it expressly stated that the military should at all times be under strict subordination to the civilian, and New York and Rhode Island wanted a provision that no standing army should be kept unless necessary.

² "American Selective Service," a pamphlet prepared under the supervision of the Army and Navy Selective Service Committee says (p. 3): "Thus until the accession of James I. England's traditional defense was the armed militia, the Nation in arms. As a fighting force it was inefficient, ill-trained, undisciplined, incapable of prolonged campaigning, and constitutionally exempt from foreign service. This instrument of war was inherited by the United States in all its congenital weakness."

the national security. If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the body to whose care the protection of the State is committed, ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. . . . To render an army unnecessary will be a more certain method of preventing its existence than a thousand prohibitions upon paper.

And he concludes more decisively that a militia with a select corps of moderate extent appears to him "the only substitute that can be devised for a standing army and the best possible security against it, if it should exist."

*The Militia Acts of 1792.*³ The popular policy of providing for the common defence primarily through the militia was even more clearly revealed in the first Militia Act of May 8, 1792, and the prior act (six days) of May 2, 1792. The Militia Act of May 8, 1792, "prescribed the enrollment of every free, able-bodied white male citizen between the ages of 18 and 45 in the militia of the several states." The word "white" was later omitted and the initial age fluctuated between 18 and 20. Militiamen were required to provide their own uniforms, arms and equipment and keep them on hand ready for immediate use. The law offered to an enrolled militiaman so equipped, exemption from all suits for debts or for the payment of taxes. The Articles of War, enacted March

21, 1778, were made part of this first Militia Act. Militiamen, wounded or disabled in the service of the United States, were to be cared for at public expense. However, by an Act of April 23, 1803, Congress began the policy of appropriating money for training and equipping the militia. By the Act of May 2, 1792, the President was authorized to call forth the militia into the service of the United States whenever it was invaded or in imminent danger of invasion, for a period of two years and from thence to the end of the next session of Congress and no longer.

The idea has been often expressed that had the militia powers resulted in developing a satisfactory system of national defence as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution and their successors in Congress, the inherited aversion for regular armies would undoubtedly have prevented the introduction of standing armies into our system of national defence and their subsequent development.⁴

It has been assumed that the armies in American history were examples of a "nation springing to arms." All that was necessary was a call to arms in the nation's hour of need. This assumption persisted at least into 1940. That very able Senator from Michigan, Arthur Vandenberg, speaking against the pending Selective Service bill, said (answering a senator favoring the measure):

I repeat, he is tearing up 150 years of peace-

³ In the year following the Militia Act, on August 23, 1793, the revolutionary French National Convention passed a law to assure "the permanent requisition of all Frenchmen for the defence of the country." This was the "*levée en masse*" which Taine called the "universal conscript military service" and Hoffman Nickerson called "the armed horde." The wording of the 1793 law has a twentieth century ring:

"The young men shall fight; the married men shall forge weapons and transport supplies; the women will make tents and clothes and will serve in the hospitals; the children will make up old linen into lint; the old men will have themselves carried into the public squares to rouse the courage of the fighting men, to preach hatred against . . . [the enemy] . . . and the unity of . . . [our own people].

"The public buildings shall be turned into barracks, the public squares into munition factories; the earthen floors of cellars shall be treated with lye to extract saltpeter.

"All firearms of suitable calibre shall be turned over to the troops: the interior shall be policed with shot guns and with cold steel.

"All saddle horses shall be seized for the cavalry; all draft horses not employed in cultivation will draw the artillery and supply wagons."

Nickerson defines the situation before this:

"Past civilizations however tended to rid themselves of the armed horde. As the division of labor affected military institutions, the proportion of men who had little or nothing to do with war increased. Up to about a century and a half ago the emancipation of civilized states from the every-man-a-soldier idea might be considered a mark or index of their civilization."

In spite of the Prussian example and the "mastery of all continental Europe" (Taine), the United States did not succumb to the idea until 1917. Instead of the curve of war descending and the increasing bloodlessness of war as Nickerson predicted in the early days of the 1939 blitzkrieg war has now become so terrible that it is not merely folly, it is civilization's suicide. It

is interesting to note that at this time (1793) Clausewitz at age 13 saw service in the Rhineland campaign in the Prussian Army.

"The potentialities of the militia idea as conceived by the framers of the constitution were never actualized. The National Guard is the natural result of what Hamilton called the "select corps" of the militia. For it the constitution provided a great role to play, but it continually complains it lacks the support of the regular army,—a confession that it has lost the independence of the original conception. There is a strong feeling—not of cooperation—but of the two. This situation has developed out of the natural but unwise desire of the National Guard officers for federal recognition, federal status, and federal aid. And the loss of effectiveness as a distinctively state organization is added to by the dual oath National Guard officers take to the National Guard of the State and the Governor, and to the so-called National Guard of the United States and the President. The creation of Reserve Officers, the distinction between the United States Army and the Army of the United States, the proposal to organize a National Militia under the army clauses of the constitution, the creation of reserves from the Selective Service Act of 1940 (approximately 12 million) and of the reserve to be created by a proposed universal military training program, were all designed to promote the regular Army. The emphasis today is entirely different than that contemplated in the constitution, and the dominant and controlling force is in the professional army, not in the militia. The development has taken place without any changes in the wording of the constitution but social forces of urbanization, of rapid communication and transportation, of technological development, of the nature of war, of nuclear supersonic missiles, of nations seeking world dominion, of the moral chaos of international relations, have all had their effect in the new pattern of American military policy. The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that the congressional power in the army (and navy clause) is plenary, exclusive, unlimited, full, complete and unconditional in the duty to raise armies and to utilize conscription."

time history, and precipitating compulsory peacetime service before he knows whether or not it will be necessary. The difference between us is the fundamental one that I do not want the Congress to commit itself to a principle which I consider to be repugnant to the American way of life, unless and until it is obvious and evident that there is absolutely no other way by which we can adequately prepare.

And another Senator from the Midwest used a familiar image:

The volunteer soldier makes the best soldier on the face of the earth. When Israel Putnam left his plow in the furrowed field and marched away in order that he might attend the birth of a nation he initiated the spirit of the American soldier, and that spirit has persisted throughout our history. Today this country has more than 50,000,000 Israel Putnams who will leave their plows in the furrowed fields and answer the bugle call to repel the invader in defense of their flag. We destroy patriotism and love for the flag when we sear the volunteer soldier with a conscription brand.

Daniel Webster in opposing the proposed 1814 conscription measure said, "A free government with an uncontrolled power of military conscription is a solecism, at once the most ridiculous and abominable that ever entered the head of man."

Even in the Revolution, the army never exceeded two-thirds of its authorized strength of 20,000, despite bounties of \$400, which the Legislature of Virginia increased for one-term recruits to \$750, a suit of clothes and 100 acres of land. General Crowder, commenting on the outstanding fact of the volunteer system in the Revolution, says that it took a nation three million strong seven years with the aid of an ally to expel an invading force whose maximum strength was 42,000.

The same story is told of the War of 1812; with a population of 7,000,000, the authorized strength of the Regular Army was 35,000 but its actual strength, 6,200. The total British force on the continent of North America was 4,500. The failure to respond fully to the call of the President to defend Washington, and the retreat after the first short battle is commentary enough on the volunteer system. The short term for which volunteers could be recruited was reflected in the Mexican War. General Scott, against an inferior enemy in the march on Mexico City, had to send home 4,000 volunteers—

40 per cent of his army, whose term of enlistment had expired—and wait weeks for reinforcements while a demoralized enemy was reinforced and reorganized.

The failure of the volunteer system in both North and South led to the Civil War drafts and ensuing riots. In the earlier history of volunteering, the extraneous methods of bounties, substitutes and money payments instead of service were needed to help make it work at all. It was the coercive effects of the selective service laws in World War I and World War II that explain much of the volunteering and this motivation was used uncouthly by the armed services themselves. General Crowder also pointed out what he called the most vital blow of the pernicious system of volunteer recruitment—the volunteering of highly patriotic men who could render a greater service to the country in wartime in using their special abilities in industry. Finally, toward the end of World War I, all voluntary enlistment was abandoned.

Volunteering is clear evidence of a lack of a manpower policy. Indiscriminate volunteering places individuals frequently where they do not render the highest service and the processes of production are disrupted and disorganized. The rush of students, patriotically stirred, often means a loss of great potential power, though of course many will naturally want to serve in the armed forces, and at the beginning of a war there may be need to permit recruiting when military units are not up to authorized strength. The extraordinary changes in the character of war makes an orderly selective manpower policy indispensable.⁵

⁵ "From the standpoint of our military history there is no more clearly established fact than the failure of the volunteer system. The United States have not yet warred with a first-class power free to devote its entire attention to them. Nevertheless, in our wars the system has regularly broken down. The leading States of Massachusetts and Virginia were forced to resort to the draft by 1777, or only two years after the opening of the Revolution. During the course of that war, in spite of such sporadic efforts by different States, the patriot armies shrunk in number from 89,000 in 1776 to 29,000 in 1781, and our cause was only saved from failure by the timely intervention of the French fleet and army. In 1812 the volunteer system broke down in so many and varied ways as to make that war the most conspicuous example in our history of how not to carry on military operations. During the Civil War both sides were forced to use the draft—the South within a year and the North shortly thereafter. Even in our little war with Spain the full quota of volunteers called for by the President was never obtained. The failure last summer of recruits to appear when called for by the President to meet a national emergency, although over a million citizens were parading and shouting themselves hoarse for preparedness, is merely the latest incident of what has been a practically unbroken record in our history." Henry L. Stimson's article, "The Basis of National Military Training: Failure of the Volunteer System," *Scribner's Magazine*, April, 1917.

Civil War Drafts and Riots

President Lincoln's first call for 75,000 volunteers for three months was promptly filled, but the ready response diminished in successive calls, and the call of July 2, 1862, was a failure. The volunteer system had collapsed and was incapable of furnishing further recruits at a time of dire necessity of the nation, and conscription was necessary. The Civil War draft laws followed and the reaction was the Civil War draft riots.

The Enrollment Act was passed March 3, 1863, making men between the ages of 20 and 45 liable for military service. The idea of conscript soldiers was never popular. The idea had also the handicaps of a law, poorly conceived, poorly framed and poorly administered. Some of its weaknesses were the military administration, the detection of spies and deserters by the draft officials, the house to house canvas by military officers for persons liable to military service, the system of avoiding service by the payment of bounties, the provision of substitutes, and the commutation of the service by a cash payment of \$300. Districts were held responsible for filling their quotas. "Substitute brokers" traded in substitutes. "Professional substitutes" sold themselves, deserted and sold themselves again, and bounty jumpers enlisted, deserted and then enlisted again for additional bounties. Prior to the enactment of the Enrollment Act, the government paid \$91,595,900 in bounties. After that date, it paid \$209,636,600 or a total of \$300,233,500 so that the total expenditures for bounties was \$586,164,538. Hardly a spontaneous nation springing to arms at the country's call.

The confederacy draft law revealed clearly the effect of exempting classes of individuals from the law. Clerks, teachers, lawyers, newspapermen and druggists and many with no relation to the war effort were exempted. These occupations attracted draft dodgers, teachers who ran schools without pupils, editors of newspapers without circulation and officers of home guards hundreds of miles from any battlefield. Pharmacy became a very popular occupation.⁶

We need not follow the details of this sad story, but note a study made by an officer in Illinois (General Oakes) which contained a series of recommendations which guided

General Enoch Crowder and General (then Captain) Hugh S. Johnson, in the drafting of the 1917 legislation. His recommendations were:

1. Registration by personal report of the citizen at a registration office, and not by a house-to-house census;
2. The determination of regional liability for manpower to be made by the place of residence of the citizen, and not by his casual place of registration;
3. The responsibility for furnishing quotas to be allotted to the several States, and not to the congressional districts, and the calculations of the quantities to be centralized at State headquarters;
4. Substitutes to be forbidden;
5. Bounties for volunteering to be forbidden;
6. Short periods of service to be abandoned, and the duration of war to be the uniform period of service;
7. State headquarters to have a supervising medical aide; and
8. State officials to have legal advisers on the administration of the law.

The Selective Service Law of 1917

In the conscription law of 1917, euphemistically called the Selective Service law, the idea of conscription in spite of traditional prejudice had its first opportunity for a real trial. It avoided in its plan and administration every concept of regimentation, of absolutism, and of disregard of individual rights so often associated with conscription, and the odium of the "conscript soldier," which however did not entirely disappear. The Oakes statement regarding Civil War failures as already noted impressed the drafters of the 1917 law. Administration must be genuinely civilian, not military. No bounties were to induce persons to enter military service. No substitutes to avoid personal military service. No purchases of exemption from military service. The law of 1917 was one which more than other laws "attempted so complete a reliance in voluntary cooperation of its citizens for its execution."

Extraordinary power was given to a group of neighbors to make an important decision —involving life or death—of persons who lived next door to them or in their neighborhood. While the civilian was obviously the

⁶ It is interesting to note the way draft dodgers work under the 1940 Selective Service Law. There were such who sought haven in West Point and the FBI and succeeded.

dominant factor of the administration of the law, the military elements in the administration were largely citizens who were temporarily invested with governmental power and wore uniforms, and in the state headquarters acted in the name of the governor. A great principle of the plan was the maintenance of a civilian military balance. Every soldier in the field needed as his support a number of civilians in the factories producing his equipment, food and clothing, and in the communities preserving the welfare conditions for his family, and maintaining the government. The means used to secure this was a classification system into five classes with the first class immediately available and the fifth class exempted or the last to be called. Conscientious objection to war on religious grounds deferred one from military service or required service in non-combatant activities. The complete reliance on the local board in the beginning, inducting the registrant at the local board, was shifted to the military later and was even stronger in the 1940's.

The principle of the military obligations of citizenship during certain ages were here carried out in an orderly and just manner. There was an attempt in a rough manner to balance the military, the productive and the social needs of a nation at war. Though aliens were registered as a protective measure, they were not liable for military service. Priests, rabbis and ministers and theological students were exempt or deferred and conscientious objection to war was recognized.

One of the officers on duty at National Headquarters in 1917-1918, as I recall, Colonel John Langston, a very able officer, wrote a memorandum on the principal failures of the 1917-1918 law:

1. failure to stop volunteering as soon as the law was passed
2. the utilization of "competent orders" issued by the military authorities to prevent drafting of individuals
3. administration by adjutant generals (in some states) rather than by the governors
4. different physical standards, under which registrants were rejected in one board, accepted in another
5. acquiring basis of deferred classification after the initiation of Selective Service Act
6. no success in dealing with draft evaders, delinquents and deserters (not however strictly

a function of Selective Service but of the investigative or police agencies of the Federal government).

World War II Conscription

Though the nature of war had passed from a war of position to blitzkrieg, the airplane became a major factor, and pilotless missiles and greater firepower were new violent factors, the essential plan of the Selective Service System in World War I was followed in World War II. There were at the beginning the same primary elements of the system: registration in age groups, classification by local boards and physical examination, but now the military finally determined induction.

The Selective Training and Service Act which became law September 16, 1940, was introduced not at the request of the armed forces, but by a group of citizens called the Military Training Camps Association and also called the Plattsburg group. There was much opposition to this first peacetime conscription law. During the consideration of the bill, 27 amendments were proposed in the Senate, and 18 were accepted and 9 rejected; in the House there were 44 amendments introduced and 29 rejected. Thus was expressed the traditional American attitude in this area of opinion. Though the original Militia Act of 1792 is sometimes called the first American peacetime conscription act, it only placed the liability for service on the male white citizenship of the military ages, while the 1940 law declared anew the liability and actually sent men in peacetime into training and service.⁷

War came. Pearl Harbor, "on a day that will live in infamy", December 7, 1941, was to be the rude awakening of a nation unprepared for war, unorganized for war, and, prior to Pearl Harbor, with no disposition for war. The peacetime Selective Service law was changed. Liability to service was reaffirmed for the 18-45 age group, service was extended for the duration of the war and

⁷ Especially interesting in this connection is language in a Supreme Court decision in a registration case under the 1940 Act:

"In this present period, the wars undeclared under the law of nations, the disregard of international convention, the hostile concentrations cloaked by manifestos of pacific intention, the elimination of time and distance as ponderable factors, the lightning strokes of modern arms are actualities over which the words 'at peace' cannot be permitted to tyrannize in making judgments." [Stone v. Christensen, 36 F. Supp. 739.]

a reasonable period afterwards, the restriction of service to the Western hemisphere was removed, stricter rules for alien enemies were made, greater national interest in the drafted man and other soldiers was expressed in laws providing for physical and vocational rehabilitation, reemployment rights, family allowances, insurance and educational opportunities.

Many problems were created by the greater demands for manpower. Dependency, particularly as related to fathers, was a difficult problem all through the war, with regulations requiring non-fathers to be called before fathers in the same class. Ultimately, dependency (Class III) was abolished as a basis for deferment. Fathers draft bills to protect fathers were introduced in Congress without becoming law. A preliminary step in this development was tying dependency to essential work and avoiding non-deferrable occupations. Industrial classification changed frequently from necessary to essential to indispensable work as the basis for deferment. Lists of non-essential or non-deferrable occupations were made. The spirit of the "work or fight order" of World War I was invoked. Ultimately there was in factories an orderly plan of sending men into service on a replacement schedule which listed men in the order in which they might be spared. Conscription of labor was also proposed but we mention that later. A special procedure was provided to protect the number of doctors, dentists and veterinarians in civil communities, while meeting the needs of the military services. The age group selected for military service included at one time the whole age group, 18-45, but was confined at the end of the war largely to the 18-25 age group. In December, 1944, there was completed a registration of all persons living abroad who were liable for military service. A rather spectacular registration was the fourth of the six, which registered all male persons between the ages of 45-65, i.e., persons not liable for military service.

This registration of older men was completed in an atmosphere of universal conscription, a move toward universal service, that did not develop. There was a group opinion that if we conscripted men for military service, there should be a conscription of wealth, of labor and property. At any

rate, as early as 1942 there was talk of a labor draft. Comprehensive measures for National Service were introduced in Congress, actively supported by those responsible for initiating the Selective Service Act of 1940, and by Secretary of War Henry Stimson. The several bills got nowhere, along with the contemplated universal military training act.

One often wondered whether the Selective Service System was merely a machine to grind out the number of men the armed forces said they needed during a current month. It was known that the industrial mobilization plans of the 1930's had no method of manpower procurement. One wondered, too, whether any strategic plan for manpower existed;⁸ the provision of equipment did not indicate any. Questions were raised as to the effective utilization of men by the armed forces. With a national policy of drift, the pressures on the Selective Service classification were many and it was extremely fluid and fluctuating.⁹

World War II experience showed fully that any conscription for military purpose has its effect and reverberations on the whole economy and the whole nation. What is needed is a policy based not on military consideration only but on the total national picture. Taking men out of their normal ways of living in their productive years, or taking only the younger men because they are better fighting material and more easily trained results in a condition for which we were unprepared, and creates a hiatus in a generation in the future. Woman-power, which became the greatest source of increase in manpower in industry and an additional source in the military services, raised issues we did not anticipate or perhaps we hoped not to face. Industry was naturally affected and community problems were af-

⁸ An amazing thing happened before our entry into World War II. A Chicago newspaper published the highly secret United States strategic plan for the war.

⁹ This is well illustrated in the classification activity of the Selective Service System during the month of October, 1942. There were in that month 4,190,580 classifications actions of which 1,438,510 were of persons previously unclassified. Approximately three million were being reclassified—a continuing process. There were in this month 352,777 enlistments (Class 1C), including persons previously classified in essential industry (Class II), with dependents (Class III), conscientious objectors, aliens, and those physically or otherwise unclassified (Class 4F). Of the 294,620 placed in class 4F this month 275,000 were reclassified from the other classes. So likewise registrants from all classes were placed in 1A, the class immediately available for military service, with 715,000 of the 908,000 in this class pending physical examination, of which ordinarily 30 per cent were usually rejected.

fected in many ways, especially health problems. Even in that situation, which is not anything like the problem we face, we only managed haphazardly. In an age of atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs and nuclear warhead missiles the problem of the whole of the organization of our life is affected, and our present lack of interest or cooperation even with civil defense is an indication of our indifference, the enormity of the problem and the need for planning in our future.¹⁰

Selective Service in the Cold War

The wartime Selective Service Act expired on March, 1947, but was not re-enacted until June, 1948. In the meantime there was established an interim organization called the "Office of Selective Service Records," which was charged with (1) preserving and servicing the records of the 50 million citizens who were registrants under the system, and (2) "the knowledge and methods of Selective Service," and (3) what was called the liquidation of the administration of the system within a year.

On March 1, 1948, the Army was 129,000 below its authorized strength of 669,000. The old trouble of the failure of volunteering was present and President Truman in his message on March 17, 1948, said:

I recommend the temporary enactment of selective service legislation in order to maintain our armed forces at their authorized strength.

Our armed forces lack the necessary men to maintain their authorized strength. They have been unable to maintain their authorized strength through voluntary enlistments, even though such strength has been reduced to the very minimum to meet our obligation abroad and is far below the minimum which should always be available in the United States.

We cannot meet our international responsibilities unless we maintain our armed forces. It is of vital importance that we keep our occupation forces in Germany until the peace is secure in Europe.

The law was passed and was re-enacted in 1951, when it became known as the "Universal Military Training and Service Act." The change in title is significant of the education of the public in this phase of manpower problems. Except for the 15 months between March, 1947, and June, 1948, we have had a draft law on our books since 1940. The latest extension of it was in 1959.

Chairman Carl Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee indicated in March, 1959, one reason for the enactment, after noting the failure of volunteering in 1948:

Now in those days [1948] we were talking about increasing our strength from 1,384,000 to 2,000,000 and it required a draft law to accomplish that objective. Today we are talking about a force in excess of 2½ million men. So it must be obvious that if we had difficulty in maintaining a force of 1,384,000 in 1948, and found it impossible to go to 2,000,000 men on a voluntary basis, that the problem would be compounded today, if we attempted to maintain a force of 2½ million men on a voluntary basis.

Mr. Vinson added that all of us would like to see the day "when the draft is no longer necessary," but it was obvious to anyone who studied the problems that the draft is "indispensable to our security." The 1959 law had four objectives: to extend for 4 years from 1 July, 1959, to 1 July, 1963, (1) the draft law, (2) the suspension limitation on the authorized strength of the Armed Forces (3) the Dependent Assistance Act of 1950, and (4) the Doctors Draft Act.

The Doctors Draft Act needs a word of comment as a special method for securing professional personnel. The liability to military service of registrants extended to age 26. These were the years of the training of doctors. To permit them to continue their professional training they were deferred to complete it but their liability to military service was extended to age 35. This protected the supply of doctors and secured the great number of doctors necessary for the services. Doctors entered the military service as reserve officers, usually as Captains in the Army and Lieutenants in the Navy.

A significant development in connection with Selective Service is the specific character

¹⁰ The Director of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Dr. R. E. Gibson, put the present situation succinctly:

"No longer have we time to mobilize our industrial and military strength to build up a defense after the intentions of an aggressive enemy have become obvious by overt act; no longer need he overcome the natural obstacles of land and sea to reach a position from which to mount an overwhelming offensive For the first time in history, two nations sit with loaded and cocked pistols aimed at each others hearts. Our national security depends on our power to deter the Soviets from pulling the trigger by the realization that they will be demolished if they do. There is no historic parallel that encourages the belief that the possession of long range missiles armed with heavy warheads will be confined for long to the United States and the U.S.S.R. or even to the nations of Europe as well. What will happen when nations whose ambitions far exceed their resources gain the capability of the ballistic missile is a matter of grave concern." (From "Life in the Missile Age," Nov. 10, 1959)

of what General Hershey calls the system's interest in supporting, raising and maintaining each of the reserve programs. Naturally it supports the ready reserve units, including the National Guard, giving them deferment in the classification scheme; but it provides penalties in accelerated induction if they do not maintain a satisfactory status with the reserves. Selective Service participates "much more heavily" in the Critical Skills Reserve, which is concerned with registrants in Class 1A with critical skills, using them in critical defense-supporting industry or in a reserve activity affecting national defense, and in the Standby Reserve, constituting those who are placed by the local board in one of four categories as to their availability for recall to active duty in the event of war or national emergency.

The basic function of the Selective Service system, based on a carefully cultivated supporting public opinion (thanks to General Hershey) is to provide a certain adequate supply of manpower for the armed forces in accordance with their request. This must be performed within legal limits and by a system of deferred classification, channeling personnel within the age limits liable to military service at the time into essential occupations. The new emphasis on reserves—"ready," "stand-by" and of "critical occupation" makes the Selective Service system an even more significant factor in creating trained manpower for the time of an emergency or war. As long as there are tensions, cold wars, and world-dominating programs of other nations, we shall probably have a selective service system reflecting in its administration the climate of world and United States opinion and the military, economic and political pressures of international affairs.

The draft, the *levée en masse* conscription or selective service—whatever you call it—was born out of the needs of the mass army,

Nickerson's "armed horde," but with technological war affecting entire populations, men, women and children, lotteries, good intentions, the good citizen, are not enough. They may even prove fatal, if our manpower plans call for outmoded wars and for manpower with the limits of firepower of the past, and the type of destructions that preceded Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Whatever we are going to do in the serious preparation for future war, the utilization of the registration devices of the Selective Service System are admirable and basic with its use of the election machinery for manpower inventories. But from that point out, if time permits, the process has to be more professional than amateur, more widely informed and more inclusive of social purposes than military considerations. It must be kept out of the hands of present types of personnel administration, particularly in government, which in its bureaucratic intoxication and spiritual blindness seeks the "organization man."

As long as the world pursues the folly of war—and the suicide of civilization or its veneer in total war—we must have now a comprehensive manpower policy. Our national effort, including our education, moves inevitably in this modern tragedy to a totalitarianism in being to meet the issues of war when it comes, for when it comes time will have run out.

But perhaps there may be in the world a sufficient number of the "men of good will" who like those on the Galilean hills were promised peace on earth. Then perhaps we shall follow the poet Oppenheim's advice, "Would you end war, Create a great Peace." Or even more simply the heathen who looked only to a crown of wild olive as life's reward through a few years of peace. Of them said Ruskin, "Not in war, not in wealth, not in tyranny was there any happiness to be found for them only in kindly peace, truthful and free."

" Since military superiority is accepted as the prerequisite for a successful policy of deterrence, the question arises whether and for how long we can maintain an adequate margin of over-all superiority. I am confident that, as of the moment, this margin is still large enough to deter the Soviets from risking war with the United States, despite their spectacular technological advances."—*General Thomas S. Power, U.S.A.F., Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, in an address on Military Problems and Prospects of Deterrence, given before the Economic Club of New York, January 19, 1960.*

Have United States alliances strengthened free world security? "Alliances comprise effective policies when the task is military and the mutual interest in defense is clear," writes this specialist. "Such factors alone permit Nato to exist as a useful, even necessary organization." In Asia, on the other hand, "an alliance not only serves no useful purpose but demonstrates an unwillingness to recognize the legitimacy of change itself."

Alliances and Free World Security

By NORMAN A. GRAEBNER
Professor of History, University of Illinois

ALLIANCES are one normal accoutrement of a system of power politics. Basically they signify the willingness of nations to sacrifice their diplomatic and military freedom in favor of the principle of collective security. Because alliances create specific commitments, nations have avoided them except when the advantages to be expected clearly outweigh the resulting loss of free decision. They have existed, therefore, in adverse ratio to the flexibility permissible at any moment in international affairs, for an alliance must begin with the definition of a common enemy—something often determinable only in time of war. Since in peacetime the ability to separate friends from enemies has been less certain, alliances in time of peace have been possible only when the clash of interests was so deep and pervading that it became an inescapable reality in world politics. Any alliance merely formalizes in precise terms a community of interest that already exists. It sets the conditions for concerted action and,

on occasion, the nature of the military contribution to be furnished.

No nation is completely free that has bartered away its right to be neutral. For that reason the present treaty commitments of the United States to other nations measure even more than the size of its military establishment the change that has been wrought by the cold war in this country's historic role in world affairs. The traditional fear of "entangling alliances" reflected a conviction that the United States, employing wisely the advantages of geographic isolation, always had the choice between involvement and non-involvement. Throughout the nineteenth century that freedom of action was anchored even more fundamentally to the reality that Europe was balanced within itself. If that reality was challenged early in the present century by the rise of the German empire, it produced no marked change in American policy because of the assurance that Britain could still defend the Atlantic ramparts.

The United States' diplomatic experience had demonstrated that any war which left the confines of Europe and ventured onto the Atlantic eventually involved the regions across the sea. What created the American illusion that the Atlantic itself was a barrier to involvement was that none of Europe's wars for a century after 1815 extended onto the sea. But twice after 1914, Britain failed to contain European aggression and twice the United States fulfilled its unwritten obligation to the British-American community of interest in the European balance of power. It required the disruption of Allied unity

Norman A. Graebner is a frequent contributor to *Current History*, and a contributing editor. Early in 1958, Mr. Graebner delivered the Commonwealth Fund Lectures in London on the subject, "The Revolution in American Politics, 1837-1877." He is the author of *Empire on the Pacific* and *The New Isolationism*, and is also a contributor to many scholarly journals.

following World War II to shatter irreparably the illusion that the United States was still an isolated nation. England and France stood in the path of German ambition and were forced to carry the burden of their own defense. But it was the United States, alone among nations, that confronted the Soviet Union after 1945, whether it was the Kremlin's ambition to stabilize its wartime gains or to add to its conquests.

Gradually the persistence of Russian belligerence forced the United States to accept the responsibility of creating a Western coalition. When Great Britain withdrew its commitments from the eastern Mediterranean, the United States assumed the burden of building centers of resistance to Soviet encroachment. Between 1947 and 1950, this nation, through the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, created a strong alliance to "contain" the Soviet Union within the limits of its wartime expansion.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Few Americans doubted the wisdom of a strong military posture toward the U.S.S.R. in 1950, for there was no apparent alternative. To western Europeans, American policies alone sustained the Atlantic Alliance in the years that followed. First, the leadership of the United States in atomic weapons was a genuine source of security against the enormous Russian military capacity on the ground. Second, the economic weakness of western European nations made United States economic aid a serious necessity. And third, the intransigence of Stalinist policies made Russia appear a dangerous and constant threat to the independence of western Europe. Either the nations of the West would accept United States economic and military support or they would face national suicide. Nato was built on the solid foundation of common interest in building strength against a known antagonist.

After ten years Nato remains a viable defense organization. Yet new forces have weakened the connection between the Atlantic Alliance and the survival of Western Europe. First, American atomic weapons no longer guarantee western European security against Soviet attack. Russia's advances in atomic weaponry have created a stalemate in

atomic power. By 1955 it was apparent to the world that the United States and the Soviet Union had reached a "parity of horror" which threatened destruction not only to themselves but also to all western Europe. It was this dread that led to the famed Summit Conference at Geneva in July, 1955. Already for many western Europeans the only hope of survival rested in blunting the sharp military conflict between the two extremes of the bipolar world.

Second, the strong trend in Western Europe that challenged American leadership resulted partially from the self-defeating nature of American economic aid. This was designed to prevent the bankruptcy and disintegration of the European economies, and yet it was obvious that the more successful the Marshall Plan, the greater would be the spirit of independence among the Allies. European recovery greatly diminished the dependence of that continent on the United States. If these nations still required American aid, it was no longer a matter of life and death. With the development of the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, the Common Market, and the threat of western Europe to extend its trade with the Soviet bloc, the economic reliance of the Allies on the United States tended to decrease even further.

Third, the Soviet Union undermined Western unity with its "new look" in foreign policy. Having earlier created the image of a ruthless nation, guided only by considerations of sheer military power, the Russians struck off a new pose after 1953 designed to relieve a world living in dread of war. Recognizing the significance of Geneva—that since nothing dare be settled by war it must be settled by negotiation, diplomacy, and accommodation—the Kremlin leaders by 1956 began to reveal amazing vigor, agility and pragmatism. Whatever the Russian proposals, they always stressed peaceful coexistence with the West. Russian policy appeared to be aimed largely at illustrating the dogmatism, rigidity and hopelessness of American devotion to military power alone. The rapid recovery of Germany, with all the fears that German political, economic, and military eminence creates throughout Europe, contributed to the opportunities confronting Soviet policy.

These subtle changes in the relationship between American economic and military might and the security of western Europe have not destroyed the common interest of the Atlantic world in a system of collective defense. But Nato, as a defensive alliance, has been built less on the belief that the organization will bring victory in war than on the conviction that it will prevent war by assuring the Soviets that aggression cannot pay. Its purpose is that of defending western Europe's independence without any resort to war. Nato will fail in its fundamental purpose at the moment that nuclear war comes to Europe, for that continent has no taste for the ultimate peace of the graveyard.

At the core of Nato's strength and unity is its military structure, resting on the foundation of the American defense commitment to western Europe. Without the steady conviction that the United States would fulfill its obligation to the Nato members, the alliance would have ceased to exist. This essential assurance American leadership has sought to sustain. The late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles observed at a news conference in November, 1957:

I think that the commitment, as far as the treaty is concerned, is as strong as it could be made. It is hard to get much further in an agreement than "an attack upon one is an attack upon all." That is, in turn, reinforced by the presence at the forward positions of American forces which would presumably be themselves attacked.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower added at Paris a month later:

Speaking for my own country, I assure you in the most solemn terms that the United States would come, at once and with all appropriate force, to the assistance of any Nato nation subjected to armed attack. This is the resolve of the United States—of all parts and of all parties.

American policy at the Nato Meeting of Heads of Government at Paris in December, 1957, was aimed at establishing stockpiles of nuclear warheads and missile bases in western Europe. Such weapons already existed in Europe for the use of American forces; now they would be made available to the Allies. Mr. Dulles sought thereby to reassure the Nato members that the United States would continue to support its treaty obligations.

At Paris, American proposals for augmenting Western defenses received wide support.

"In the interest of peace," said Prime Minister Joseph Bech of Luxembourg, "it is . . . essential to set against the Soviet bloc sufficient military strength to ensure that the balance of power is never upset." Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary General of Nato, agreed that the alliance's defense structure must be as powerful and efficient as possible. Premier Adoni Zoli of Italy, pointing to the Soviet advances in weaponry, made it imperative that the Western nations "pledge themselves with all means to reinforce their cooperation so as to profit as much as possible from their united resources." These men had their way. The conference voted to accept the American offer of missile bases for Nato.

Yet the alliance's chief deterrent power has not been built on local military installations, capable of resisting a conventional attack, but on nuclear weapons and the means of conveying them to targets behind the Iron Curtain. The nominal ground forces have assumed the function of a "trip wire" to set off a nuclear war. Since few assume that war in Europe can be localized, peace has become the only alternative to general destruction. Increasingly Nato has clung to the threat of thermonuclear reprisal as the only available means of keeping aggression away from its door.

The Impact of Technology

Anchoring strategy to peace through terror exposes Nato to the pressures of technological change. When Dulles announced the American reliance on massive retaliation in 1954, the defense of the United States itself was not at issue. The problem was to insure the defense of western Europe with reduced military forces. As long as the airplane was the only vehicle available for delivering nuclear weapons, the United States required bases in Europe. Herein American and European strategic interests converged, for without American weapons Europe had no deterrent and without European bases the United States had no means of reaching its prospective targets. But many Europeans have wondered how long this mutual interest will continue after long-range guided missiles replace aircraft as the means of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Western Europe would cease to be vital to American strategy.

What has produced an even greater revo-

lution in Europe's strategic concepts has been the development of Russian ICBM's that could reach the United States. Now that the United States itself is vulnerable to attack, Europeans wonder if this nation would, under all circumstances, come to the rescue of western Europe with nuclear weapons. Would the United States, they ask, become too busy manning its own defenses to look out for its allies? Somehow the United States seemed much more reliable when it was invulnerable. Duncan Sandys, the British Minister of Defense, gave evidence of such fears when he justified the new British emphasis on atomic armaments in April, 1957: "When the United States has developed the 5000-mile intercontinental ballistic rocket can we really be sure that every American administration will go on looking at things in the same way?" The British rationale for developing its own deterrents was stated forcefully by T. F. Thompson in the London *Daily Mail* on February 9, 1959:

Soon the United States will have its intercontinental missile bases established on its home territory. Relationships then will change. Not only between the U.S. and Russia, but the U.S. and Europe. For the first time in the history of modern war, America will be in a position to guarantee its own territory without having to bother with advance bases in Europe. . . . The position will then be that the United States would not dare attack Russia nor the Soviet Union the American homeland. . . . It is at this point that the British deterrent becomes important. We are in Europe. We are of Europe. . . . Britain would have to retaliate with nuclear weapons at the outset of a major attack in Europe with conventional forces. The alternatives would be the end of our way of life.

British conservatives, following the American lead, have assured their people that Britain cannot afford conventional forces; they also have preferred to warn the Soviets that they will use nuclear weapons against any attack on western Europe. The logic of the argument that nuclear weapons assure peace renders conventional forces almost irrelevant. Alexander Bregman, the British writer, argued in *Western World* of October, 1959, that the arming of all nations with nuclear weapons is the best hope for peace. Even the strongest nation, he predicted, would not attack a weak country as long as the weak could retaliate effectively. The

British deterrent, declared one government spokesman,

removes any danger that the Soviet Union may be tempted to invade Western Europe in the misguided belief that the United States of America, faced with the possibility of bombardment by intercontinental missiles, would shrink from saving countries which are distant from her.

Such argument attempts to reassure western Europe by returning the responsibility for its defense from the United States to England.

Not all British writers are agreed that their country can carry out this heroic role. Some critics of British military policy wonder, first, whether an area as small as the British Isles can maintain the necessary stockpile of weapons and the means of delivering them to pose a genuine deterrent. Second, they believe Britain too vulnerable to serve as an adequate springboard for a counterattack. The *New Statesman* has argued:

If Mr. Sandys' deterrent is employed, it will inevitably lead to the extermination of life on these islands. . . . No British Prime Minister could possibly take such a decision. The strategy of the deterrent is a purely theoretical concept designed to meet a contingency which, the politicians believe, will never occur. But if it does, the deterrent will immediately be revealed for what it is: a bluff. . . . And once the monumental bluff of the Great Deterrent were called, the West [lacking sufficient conventional forces] would have no alternatives but to accept a last-minute Munich settlement. . . . Hence the political consequences of [this] defense policy is a foreign policy based on appeasement.

What has bothered British critics, furthermore, is the doubt that British policy has considered all the reasonable military and political alternatives. They doubt that it leaves room for maneuvering in meeting local aggression with limited force, and since it appears incapable of preventing local aggression, they fear that the threat of nuclear retaliation merely invites the Russians to move out along the ground. At the other extreme, they charge that the divorcing of British defense policy from moral considerations threatens to turn even a just war into universal destruction.

Nato continues to survive the strains of technological change because nothing has challenged the common interests of its members. Security-minded Europeans still find comfort in the presence of American forces

on the continent. Yet the fundamental challenge to Nato remains. Eventually it must discover the means of reducing the threat of war or it must be able to guarantee the survival of western Europe should war come. It is not clear how Western leadership, clinging to its goals of liberation in Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany, can secure any cold war settlements commensurate with its demands. It is even less clear how the Atlantic Alliance, with its reliance on nuclear weapons, can either limit war or protect its members from annihilation. What matters is that Europeans, under the constant threat of nuclear destruction, should not conclude that safety lies more in the remoteness than in the proximity of Allied atomic installations. "Continued armament," said Prime Minister H. C. Hansen of Denmark at Paris in December, 1957,

does not, in itself, lead to a solution of the issues dividing East and West. . . . Our peoples must rest assured that while preserving our rights and our ideals, we will leave unexploited no opportunity to ease international tensions. . . . Only if our populations are convinced that this is Nato's firm and unshakeable will, shall our Alliance be able to retain the strongest weapon of all: the determined will of each individual to defend his freedom.

Alliances in Asia

Not until the Korean War demonstrated the strength and aggressiveness of mainland China did American leadership accept the necessity of building an alliance system in Asia. In August and September, 1951, the Truman administration negotiated mutual defense treaties with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. In both treaties the signatories agreed that "each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." Neither pact committed the nations to more than consultation in case of threatened attack.

Nor did the Japanese Treaty of 1951 place any obligation on the United States. It did not even require previous consultation. But it granted the United States the right to maintain land, air and naval forces in and about Japan. Since 1951, Japanese internal

development, plus the fear that the nuclear stalemate makes an alliance with the United States increasingly dangerous, prompted the Japanese government to demand greater voice in the alliance. The new treaty of January, 1960, establishes the principles of consultation and of "self-help and mutual aid" in developing the capabilities to resist armed attack. The two nations agree to join in the defense of Japan and to contribute, through their combined strength, to the security of the Far East. Again the United States secured the use of Japanese facilities and areas for its military forces. But the Japanese reserved the right to determine how American troops on Japanese soil will be deployed, for the Japanese are determined not to be drawn into a war, especially against mainland China, by the support which the United States would require from its Japanese bases.

To broaden the American alliance system in the Orient, the Eisenhower administration negotiated a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of Korea in October, 1953. It includes the principle of consultation and of self-help and mutual aid. This treaty, like those with the Philippines and Australia and New Zealand, applies the concept of the "Monroe Doctrine" to the Far East. It establishes an area in which an attack would be viewed as dangerous to American security, but it does not commit the United States to any precise action. A Pacific Nato was impossible, Dulles admitted, because cultural and political differences among the Pacific allies, as well as physical separation, ruled out any close alliance.

SEATO

Following the triumph of Communist forces in northern Indochina in 1954, Dulles negotiated the Manila Pact which included the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. These eight nations agreed to act jointly against "any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area" south of Formosa. As a military arrangement it was of doubtful value, for the only nations that could have made it a success in building the needed balance of power in the Orient—India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia—refused to join it. These four nations preferred to maintain their neutralist position in

the conflict that centered in the United States and mainland China.

For the United States the pact was aimed at stopping the spread of international communism through armed force. But because such a threat was remote and common action almost impossible, the pact required little of its Asian members but a commitment to anti-communism. On the other hand, the Asian signatories could make special claims on the United States for financial and political support. Whatever compatibility of interest flowed from the American desire for allies and the Asian desire for American aid, it did not cover such specific and crucial questions as the future of China. For its inconsequential military support the United States was willing to pay a high political price. By furnishing arms to Pakistan, for example, it placed an enormous military and political burden on India, a nation of even greater interest to the United States.

For the active defense of southeast Asia the United States carries a unilateral burden. For budgetary reasons that defense has been limited to mobile striking power, for American leadership has viewed the build-up of military establishments in the region as "an injudicious overextension of our military power." "We do not have the adequate forces to do it," Dulles explained, "and I believe that if there should be an open armed attack in that area the most effective step would be to strike at the source of the aggression rather than to try to rush American manpower into the area to try to fight a ground war."

The Chinese Alliance

In December, 1954, the Secretary completed the American alliance structure in Asia by negotiating a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China on Formosa. The treaty was similar in nature and provisions to that signed with Korea. The agreement with Chiang Kai-shek prevents any Nationalist Chinese forays against the mainland by establishing the requirement that all use of force in the Formosan Straits be a matter of joint agreement unless the question is self-defense.

Alliances have become a measure of American success in building centers of resistance to the Soviet bloc; they demonstrate also the

limitations of such purpose. American alliance policy has been predicated on the assumption of a divided world in which no nation has a right to its neutrality. Dulles, referring to the agreements which had built the American alliance system, made this clear at Iowa State College in June, 1956:

These treaties abolish, as between the parties, the principle of neutrality, which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others. This has increasingly become an obsolete conception and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and shortsighted conception. The free world today is stronger, and peace is more secure, because so many free nations courageously recognize the now demonstrated fact that their own peace and safety would be endangered by assault on freedom elsewhere.

That freedom of choice on which this nation relied as recently as 20 years ago is now denied to others as immoral behavior.

Bipolarity Rejected

Most nations have rejected the American concept of a bipolar world. They have refused to enter any military arrangements with the West at all, for they regard the postwar structure of world politics as neither stable nor permanent. The very notion of a divided world in which all nations can be accurately categorized as friends, enemies and neutrals is unrealistic, for national interests are too fluid. Outside Europe Nato has been ineffective, for there Allied interests have not coincided at all. In most conflicts of the past decade America's allies, both European and Asian, have behaved as neutrals. Circumstances and particulars determine international relationships, not the affixing of signatures to treaties.

This nation's search for allies has reflected its legalistic approach to foreign policy. Hans J. Morgenthau pointed unerringly to this dilemma when he wrote:

Instead of recognizing that alliances can be useful, harmful or superfluous depending on the circumstances and therefore discriminating among them in view of the interests to be served and the policies to be pursued, we have followed what might be called the collector's approach to alliances: the more nations sign a legal docu-

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"The New Look has lost its luster," in the opinion of this specialist, analyzing the influence of the New Look on American military thinking and on diplomacy. "If strategic capabilities ever become psychologically 'neutralized,' other forms of military power will become increasingly important instruments for waging conflict. The balance might well rest with the side which possesses the superior force of men armed with relatively simple weapons." Meanwhile, "The West . . . has been hampered in its disarmament diplomacy by a military strategy that placed excessive reliance on nuclear weapons. . . . 'Nuclear parity' throws the advantage on the table of negotiation to the Soviets possessed of superior non-nuclear capabilities."

Military Security and the New Look

By ALVIN J. COTTRELL

Research Associate, Foreign Policy Research Institute,
University of Pennsylvania

MUCH public attention has been focused lately on the "missile gap" and inter-service rivalry. Yet, a more searching debate over American defense policy—carried on largely among the services and military experts inside and outside the government—has centered on the question of whether or not the United States has overemphasized the capacity to wage all-out nuclear war to the detriment of its capability to wage intermediate range conflict. Since January 12, 1954, when the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations announced the doctrine of

"massive retaliation," and more specifically since the implementation of the "Radford Plan" in 1956, American strategic concepts have been subject to increasingly severe criticism. The Dulles doctrine of "massive retaliation" set forth the idea that the United States would henceforth rely "primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and at places of our own choosing."

The doctrine of "massive retaliation" represented, at least theoretically, a reversal of the "containment policy" of George F. Kennan which had formed the conceptual basis of United States foreign policy from 1947 to 1953. Under the containment concept the United States was to pursue a reactive policy, i.e., it would apply counter pressure against Communist probes along the periphery of Eurasia at a series of constantly shifting geographical points. In theory the "containment policy" had left the choice of time, place and weapons largely up to the Communists.

But the implication of the "massive retaliation" policy was that the United States would reply to a future Communist challenge in the "grey areas" as well as in Nato territory with measured nuclear strikes by the Strategic Air Command (SAC) against the Soviet Union and China. According to this interpretation, the United States initially threatened to meet local aggression in the "grey areas" with full-scale nuclear attack

Alvin J. Cottrell, Instructor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, is co-author of *American-Asian Tensions* (Praeger, 1956), and *Protracted Conflict*, with Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner and James E. Dougherty (Harper, 1959). He was one of the principal authors of the Foreign Policy Research Institute's *A Study of United States Military Assistance Programs in the Underdeveloped Areas*, prepared for the Draper Committee, and the military section of the report on Western Europe prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

upon the major population and industrial centers of the Communist world.

Subsequently, a more sophisticated version of the "massive retaliation" concept providing for greater discrimination in retaliation came into vogue—in keeping with Gilbert and Sullivan's plea that the punishment should fit the crime. The doctrine of "massive retaliation," however modified, led inexorably to the decision of the Eisenhower Administration to place main reliance on nuclear weapons to cope with the full range of military challenges. The "Radford Plan" sought to reduce already inferior United States-Western conventional force levels by placing increased reliance on nuclear weapons.

Adopting the "New Look"

The adoption of the "New Look" in United States defense policy was, according to former Chief of Staff of the Army General Maxwell D. Taylor,

one of the most significant actions of the Eisenhower Administration. It established the direction which United States military policy has followed from 1953 to the present day. Its immediate effect was the reduction of personnel strengths for the armed services for the fiscal years 1955 and 1956 and a sharp increase of the size and level of nuclear air forces at the expense of conventional forces.¹

The Radford Plan did not altogether dismiss the need for conventional forces, but these were to be supplied largely by our allies under the United States Military Assistance Program.

Why does the United States need a conventional military capability? First, the numerous conflicts that have been waged since World War II have all been fought with conventional arms.² Secondly, it is the contention of the principal opponents of the New Look strategy that Russia's growing nuclear maturity will open to the Communist leadership an increasingly wide range of political and military options. The Soviets' capability for waging or supporting non-atomic, indirect aggression remains considerable. The Soviets, as they approach full nuclear maturity, may well conclude that limited wars, especially those initiated by satellites under ambiguous circumstances, may be "safe

wars"—wars that will not trigger all-out nuclear conflict. The various instruments of indirect aggression, such as "volunteers" and proxies, which have proven so successful in the past may be used more frequently. This capability for limited conventional war and indirect aggression may not have to be exercised in actual combat; the implied threat of its use may be sufficient to gain limited objectives.

Given the West's present defense posture and strategy, the Soviets are likely to exploit a wide spectrum of conflict possibilities short of a preemptive strike against the West. As the gap between the United States and Russia in long range delivery systems closes, the balance of power may shift increasingly to the side which holds superiority in the ability to wage conflict on levels below that of all-out nuclear war.

In short we are approaching a period when the United States strategic nuclear capability, although indispensable in its total posture, may not be of positive value in a given limited crisis. Strategic nuclear capabilities are of overriding importance in deterring a direct nuclear attack against the United States. They will not deter challenges overseas that fall below the "threshold" of an obvious issue of American survival. Strategic nuclear capabilities will not provide a reliable deterrent to Communist gambits which are so ambiguous as not to warrant the risk of 30 to 90 million United States casualties. Thus Herman Kahn, the noted Rand Corporation authority on thermonuclear war, after posing the question, "How many American dead would we accept as the cost of our retaliation?" gives the following answer:

I have discussed this question with many Americans, and after about 15 minutes of discussion their estimates of an acceptable price generally fall between 10 and 60 million dead. Their temporary first reaction, incidentally, usually is

¹ *The Uncertain Trumpet*, New York: Harper, 1960, p. 18.
² Indonesian War (1945-47); Chinese Civil War (1945-49); Malayan War (1945-49); Philippine Civil War (1945-48); Indochina War (1945-54); Greek Guerrilla War (1946-49); Kashmir Conflict (1947-49); Arab-Israeli War (1948-49); Korean War (1950-53); Guatemalan Revolt (1954); Argentine Revolution (1955); Algerian War (1954-); Cyprus War (1955-59); Sinai Campaign (1956); British-French Suez Campaign (1956); Hungarian Suppression (1956); Muscat and Oman Operations (1957); Indonesian Civil War (1958-); Lebanon and Jordan Operations (1958); Formosa Strait Conflict (1958); Cuban Civil War (1958-59); Tibetan Revolt (1959); Guerrilla Fighting in Laos (1959). It is not meant to suggest that these conflicts were all instigated by the Communists. Some were, but the majority, of course, were not.

that the United States would never be deterred from living up to its obligations by fear of a Soviet counterblow, an attitude that invariably disappears after some minutes of reflection. . . .³

"Limited War"

While much of the criticism of the New Look in United States military policy has been aimed at deficiencies in the United States weapons spectrum for fighting limited war, a more sophisticated criticism has been leveled at the feasibility of fighting limited wars with atomic weapons. According to General Taylor, the definition of limited war formulated by the Eisenhower Administration has had much to do with its conclusion that main reliance on nuclear weapons represented a sound military strategy for the United States. In General Taylor's words,

The Eisenhower Administration's policy-makers defined "general war" as a conflict in which the forces of the United States and the U.S.S.R. are directly involved and in which atomic weapons are assumed to be used from the outset.⁴

On the other hand, limited war was defined as a

conflict short of general war in which the United States forces will use atomic weapons as required to achieve national objectives. The proponents of these definitions hold that these local conflicts are likely to occur in the less-developed areas of the world outside of Europe and that only limited U.S. forces will be necessary to cope with them.⁵

The belief that Europe was a "safe" area has been widely held in Europe too. For example, Raymond Aron, one of Europe's most profound thinkers on politico-military problems wrote in 1955:

It follows that those regions where conflict cannot be localized will be relatively secure (Europe) and that, by contrast, those regions where the stakes do not warrant a general war will be relatively unsafe. Nothing will happen in Europe, because war could be fought with thermonuclear bombs, whereas, in Asia Communism can advance unhindered, because neither Laos nor Cambodia nor Thailand constitutes a *casus belli atomici*.⁶

General Taylor argues:

Both definitions [by the Eisenhower Administration] encourage the armed forces to a dependence upon the use of atomic weapons to a degree

which is open to question—there are arguments against maintaining reserves of trained manpower and military equipment to support extended military operations.⁷

Col. Robert C. Richardson, a leading Air Force planner, has argued the case for reduced manpower in the Nato area most persuasively:

any area of the free world whose loss is of sufficient concern to the U.S. to warrant the commitment of the general-war capability for its preservation requires only token local defenses or shield forces. This being true, provided we maintain the necessary general war posture, we can keep our limited war requirements quite modest.⁸

The idea that Europe has been "safe" because of its important role in United States strategy may have had some validity in the past when the United States possessed overwhelming superiority in strategic retaliatory power. But the significance of Soviet technological-military progress lies precisely in the fact that by neutralizing America's strategic capabilities it has released Russian ground strength as a formidable instrument of military-psychological pressure against the West. Parenthetically, the U.S.S.R. will still maintain a large army despite Khrushchev's announcement on January 14, 1960, that a large scale demobilization of the Red Army was planned. Indeed the Soviet strategy in Berlin seems designed to exploit this capability. The decision to integrate nuclear weapons into the American military establishment may have been taken without giving adequate consideration to whether or not the United States was psychologically prepared to initiate their use whether the enemy used them first or not. The decision was taken in the aftermath of the Korean War, during which the United States, possessing overwhelming atomic superiority, chose to fight to a stalemate with conventional weapons rather than use its atomic arsenal. But in the Lebanon crisis in 1958, the United States army did not take an Honest John rocket

³ Herman Kahn, *The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence*, Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1960, p. 15.

⁴ Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Raymond Aron, "Europe and Air Power," *The Annals*, Vol. 299, May 1955, p. 100.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁸ "Do We Need Unlimited Forces for Limited War?" *Air Force*, March, 1959, p. 56.

ashore because it could fire an atomic warhead. We were afraid even to hint at the possibility that we were prepared to wage atomic war. On the other hand the Anglo-American intervention in Lebanon and Jordan again proved that, within the framework of the "balance-of-terror," conventional military forces can be deployed in conflict situations without leading to all-out war.

One of the principal military arguments adduced in support of a strategy which would rely primarily on nuclear weapons is that, because of excessive casualties, troop concentrations in an atomic war must be held to a minimum and that there is, therefore, an inherent upper limit to the size of forces which can be effectively deployed on a nuclear battlefield. While this argument has much validity, there is no evidence that, even in a conflict in which tactical nuclear weapons are employed, the size of forces used ceases to be a meaningful criterion for victory or defeat. A good big atomic army is likely to remain superior to a good small atomic army, despite the fact that the defending side in such a conflict does hold some inherent advantages.⁹ That nuclear weapons necessarily favor the defensive side is disputed by Malcolm W. Hoag of the Rand Corporation:

If valid at all, the defensive advantage accrues only after nuclear hostilities are under way. . . . And when we are on the defensive at the outset, as we expect to be, the one clear advantage that nuclear weapons would appear to confer is upon the side that initiates their employment, especially if it does so suddenly and in considerable numbers. And if we have made clear our intent to use nuclear weapons, an aggressor has an obvious interest in being the one to initiate their use in overwhelming power.¹⁰

It is also highly questionable whether a strategy for limited nuclear war is feasible in some areas. For example, in an area as densely populated as Western and Central Europe, can atomic weapons be used without endangering civilian populations? The proponents of a strategy which calls for immediate resort to tactical atomic weapons in the event of a Soviet attack argue that the distinction must be made between large and small nuclear arms. They contend that clean weapons in the low kiloton range can keep side-effects on the local population to a minimum.

How high, however, is this minimum? Military and civilian targets in Western Europe are virtually inseparable; even if megaton weapons were not used, the level of destruction would inevitably be high. In Exercise *Carte Blanche* conducted by Nato forces in Western Germany several years ago the careful use of several hundred tactical atomic bombs was simulated in a 48 hour period; it was estimated that between one and a half and two million Germans would have died and nearly four million would have been wounded had the bombs been real.

Even if tactical nuclear weapons could be refined in terms of yield and accuracy to the point where existing casualty estimates could be drastically scaled down, there still remains the possibility that the initial use of nuclear weapons will spiral inexorably into all-out nuclear war. The proponents of a tactical atomic strategy argue that the level of the conflict, not the weapons used, will govern its scale and intensity. This assumption implies that the enemy will tacitly agree to certain nuclear ground rules. Since he presumes that the West is not anxious to start thermonuclear war and since he himself is reluctant to start one he will surmise that a nuclear weapon employed by the West is not intended to start all-out war.

This line of reasoning, to say the least, is fraught with considerable risk. In the heat of battle, an enemy may very well mistake the opponent's intentions and refuse to abide by such vaguely adumbrated rules of nuclear war.

The Russians, in Berlin and elsewhere, are dealing from a position of military-psychological strength. Their ground forces are equipped to wage both nuclear and non-nuclear war. Since a segment in the spectrum of conflict is the possibility of non-atomic war, it would appear desirable for the United States and its Western allies to complement their nuclear capabilities with the capacity to engage Soviet ground forces without automatic resort to nuclear weapons. The obvious implication is that the United States and its allies need "dual capability"

⁹ Roger Hilsman, "On NATO Strategy," in *Alliance Policy and the Cold War*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959, p. 174.

¹⁰ Malcolm Hoag, "NATO Strategy and Limited War," in *NATO and American Security*, edited by Klaus Knorr, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, p. 119.

forces. This is not to negate the importance of nuclear weapons in any future conflict: we cannot expose to Communist nuclear attack forces which are prepared to defend themselves only with conventional arms. Our nuclear weapons inject uncertainties into Soviet calculations and caution them against using their nuclear weapons in a limited attack. Evidently they will be used whenever the "limits" of non-atomic war are pierced by Soviet action.

The Missile Gap

The onus of initiating nuclear war must, however, be shifted from the United States to the Soviet Union. Indeed, in order to create a comprehensive deterrent against total war the United States must maintain first of all a strategic capability to inflict unacceptable damage upon the Soviet Union. One thing that emerges from the smouldering debate over the "missile gap" is the possibility that by 1962 or even earlier, the level of damage which the United States will be able to inflict upon Russia after a Soviet pre-emptive strike upon the continental United States may be inadequate to deter the Soviets from such an attack. This is the overriding danger inherent in the so-called "missile gap." The United States has already programmed advanced weapons systems due to become operational by 1964 which will include the solid-fueled Minuteman and Polaris missiles. But these systems may not provide the West with an invulnerable deterrent before 1964. This is why General Thomas S. Power, commander of the Strategic Air Command, has openly urged the Eisenhower Administration to authorize a partial around-the-clock airborne SAC alert while we are passing through this danger period.

If total nuclear war can be avoided during the next decade, however, the possession by both sides of a large number of either "hardened" or mobile ICBM's may make resort to general war by either side an act of calculated self-destruction. The "balance of terror" could become relatively more stable when the United States musters an adequate "second strike" capability in the form of sufficient ICBM's and Polaris missiles which can be fired from dispersed, hardened, mobile, or submerged sites. If such a point is reached and neither side develops an effective missile

defense we may reach the equivalent of *de facto* strategic-nuclear disarmament. If strategic capabilities ever become psychologically "neutralized," other forms of military power will become increasingly important instruments for waging conflict. The balance might well rest with the side which possesses the superior force of men armed with relatively simple weapons.

This brings us to the second and potentially as dangerous aspect of the "missile gap," namely the possibility that the Russians will be emboldened to take progressively greater risks as our retaliatory strength reaches its relative postwar nadir. Even if the Soviets are inhibited from launching a direct attack against Nato it seems clear that they will at least try to carry out a strategy designed to paralyze Nato—a strategy calculated to present challenges that fall below the "threshold" of a clear issue of United States survival. Also, the Russians will seek to raise this "threshold" through an incessant campaign of nuclear blackmail to a point where a move now held to be a *casus belli atomici* may not be considered an issue of American survival the day after tomorrow.

Western counterstrategy must accommodate better to the problems of leadtime. In order to be prepared for a Soviet military gambit 4 to 5 years from today, the necessary decisions must be taken now. The United States and its allies may be precariously close to the deadline for preparing a comprehensive defense scheme adequate to cope with tomorrow's weapons. The Eisenhower Administration has already largely shaped the strategy which will be followed by the next administration.

Unfortunately our opponents have an advantage over us in the matter of leadtime. Once the Soviet leadership reaches a decision and priorities are established, the price of a given weapons system ceases to be a primary consideration. This advantage in leadtime is not due to technological and intellectual superiority, but rather to the fact that the Soviets allocate funds in accordance with strategic requirements instead of determining priorities in terms of available funds as is true of Western governments.

The opponents of "dual capability" argue that if the United States undertakes to build up a sizeable conventional force, we might

one day discover that the Russians had completely abandoned the capability to wage non-atomic war, leaving us with an expensive and practically useless conventional establishment. Indeed, Mr. Khrushchev's January 14 announcement on Soviet force levels is offered as evidence that the U.S.S.R. is following our lead and adopting its own version of the New Look in Soviet defense policy. It is undoubtedly true that the Russians are modernizing their armed forces and that this modernization will entail a reduction in their conventional force levels. The fact that the Russians are accelerating the integration of atomic weapons into their strategy, however, is by no means certain proof that they are preparing to abandon the capability to wage conventional war. On the contrary, as F. O. Miksche has pointed out:

Naturally, the Soviet General Staff is also occupying itself with the problem of atomic reorganization. So far, however, the reformed units have been so organized that they can operate independently of atomic weapons. Further, atomic weapons come under the control of the army commands and not that of the divisions. . . . Unlike the Americans, the Soviet General Staff has taken care not to incorporate atomic armaments into all its army units.¹¹

Even if the Soviet Union were to withdraw 30 divisions—the total Nato ground force called for by General Norstad—and transform them into a nuclear striking force, they would still be able to maintain approximately 70 conventionally armed divisions. This is a fact of considerable diplomatic significance.¹² Raymond L. Garthoff argues in the same vein in his excellent study on current Soviet military thought, *The Soviet Image of Future War*: "The Soviets have been guided not by a replacement of the capacities for conventional warfare, but by the *addition* to them of capacities for either general or limited nuclear war."¹³

Conventional Russian Forces

Indeed, Soviet conventional capabilities are an integral element in the crisis confronting the West in Europe. The forces which have the greatest maneuverability along the Iron Curtain—and which vest Kremlin diplomacy with flexible power—are the Soviet Union's non-atomic forces. Should the Soviets, in the face of a Nato buildup of non-

atomic forces, decide to shift to an exclusively nuclear strategy, they would forfeit to the West the very advantages of diplomatic maneuverability which they now derive from conventional manpower. The Soviets have consistently maintained the initiative in negotiations for a nuclear test ban largely because of their superiority in conventional armaments. The West, on its part, has been hampered in its disarmament diplomacy by a military strategy that placed excessive reliance on nuclear weapons. The adverse ratio of the conventional forces of the West to those of the Communist bloc has resulted in a disproportion of negotiable assets. "Nuclear parity" throws the advantage on the table of negotiation to the Soviets possessed of superior non-nuclear capabilities.

It is often suggested that a ban on nuclear weapons constitutes a sensible solution to a problem which has brought the world to the brink of catastrophe. But, unless a ban on nuclear weapons is accompanied by adequate safeguards for United States-Western security in the form of a comprehensive inspection system, or by a buildup of Western conventional forces, the Western allies could endanger their very existence.

Strategically, the most profound objection to reemphasizing a local defense capability in Europe has been the argument that efforts to build such a defense would weaken the overall deterrent. It is contended that the deployment of more than "trip-wire" forces will convey to the Communist bloc our reluctance to retaliate with our strategic weapons. Thus, statements to the effect that we intend to limit our response will simply have the effect of restoring war to its historical position as an instrument of national policy. Some proponents of this view even contend that the more we reduce our conventional forces the more credible becomes our willingness to resort to all-out nuclear war.

The argument that an increase in the local deterrent will detract from the overall strategic deterrent is superficially convincing. Yet, as pointed out above, Soviet nuclear progress has already put in doubt the willingness of the United States to resort to massive nuclear

¹¹ *The Failure of Atomic Strategy*, New York: Praeger, 1958, p. 164.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959, p. 16.

retaliation in response to limited Communist challenges. The greatest danger of total war in the next decade may not be a preemptive strike on the part of either side, but rather the "degeneration" of a local engagement into all-out war. The Soviets may well calculate that they can effect a smash-grab of weakly defended areas in Western Europe or elsewhere and thus confront the United States with a *fait accompli* which we will be reluctant to reverse at the cost of initiating nuclear war. The same estimate of United States intention, however, would not necessarily apply to a large-scale and intensively contested local conflict. In Soviet calculations, an American nuclear riposte would be much more likely in the heat of a protracted ground engagement. The ability of the United States and its allies to meet a Soviet ground probe with effective military force thus enhances, rather than diminishes, the deterrent to general war.

Costs of Dual Capacity

Economically, the objective of a "dual capacity" is held by many to be impractical unless we are prepared drastically to hike our expenditures in order to generate an adequate mobilization base for a modern, sophisticated weapons system and at the same time build up and maintain a substantial non-atomic arsenal. A return by the United States and its Western allies to a major conventional capability is said to be against current trends. It is argued that so long as political leaders in the West are dazzled by the new superweapons, they will not vote the necessary funds for less glamorous conventional arms. The Russians with a gross national product considerably below that of the combined economies of North America and Western Europe are able to maintain dual capable forces.¹⁴ The question, therefore, is not whether the West can afford such a capability but whether it will recognize the full spectrum of dangers and take the requisite measures to deal with them. The penalty for a mistake in defense policy today will be much more serious than ever before in our history. As Henry A. Kissinger has suggested:

If the proposals of Generals Power and White, i.e., to maintain a 24-hour airborne alert, are accepted and prove to be wrong, we will have

spent \$500 million too much for a number of years. If the program of the President is adopted and he proves to be mistaken, we will have forfeited our national existence.¹⁵

Improving our central war deterrent while building larger "dual capability" tactical forces will impose added burdens upon the economies of the individual members of Nato, particularly the United States. These added burdens can be lightened, however, by more effective specialization and coordination of tasks within Nato.¹⁶ It is worth noting that the United Kingdom has already begun to move in the direction of a stronger non-atomic capability.¹⁷ The United States principal contribution to a strategy based on a dual capability should be that of an increase in its Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) forces capable of deployment in the Nato area as well as elsewhere. The major increases in conventional force levels should come from our allies. For example, now that France has exploded its own atomic bomb the United States should give her the information she needs to avoid further testing and thus to encourage as a *quid pro quo* the maintenance of some sizeable conventional capabilities by France. It is not even necessary to match the Soviet bloc in force levels. It is essential, however, to raise the price of entry by increasing Western non-atomic forces to a point whereby in order to do anything, all the Soviets must go all out. Hanson Baldwin has observed:

The problem of our military planners is to organize and maintain armed forces capable of fighting any kind of war anywhere. We cannot afford not to prepare to fight any kind of war anywhere. This does not, of course, mean that all kinds of forces—strategic air, defensive air, tactical air, conventional land power, nuclear land power, submarines, carriers, amphibious forces, airborne forces—should be maintained at great strength, ready instantly for war. It means, rather, that we must keep alive the art

¹⁴ "Very few, if any, economists, would support the proposition that the U.S. could not safely spend more than 10 per cent of its gross national product on defense, which is about the going rate at this writing." Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, p. 333.

¹⁵ Letter to the Editor of the *New York Times*, February 15, 1960.

¹⁶ For a fuller discussion of the New Look as it relates to Nato, see the military section of U.S. Foreign Policy—Western Europe, A Study Prepared at the Request of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Univ. of Penna., October 15, 1959, pp 35-52.

¹⁷ See the 1960 British White Paper on Defense.

of fighting any kind of war anywhere in the world, that we must have at least cadre forces of many different types keyed to different missions, capable of expansion in case of war . . . and a mobilization potential to raise more of the same after war starts.

If we do not maintain these diverse capabilities we shall freeze, in a one-weapon, one-concept mold, not only tactics but strategy, and our foreign policy will be rigidly tied to an inflexible strategic concept that permits us no freedom of action. Yet the art of diplomacy, the art of politics, the art of strategy and war, is the art of choice. We risk defeat in peace or war if we limit our military capabilities to nukes and thermonukes.¹⁸

The time has come for the Eisenhower Administration to reorient America's defense policy. The 1953 decision to move toward the most powerful and technologically advanced weapons was instinctively sound. But the Administration's failure to maintain overall technological superiority undercut the very foundation on which America's New Look strategy was based. The New Look has lost its lustre. Barring an as yet unlikely disarmament agreement, American security must henceforth rest on the twin pillars of an indestructible long-range nuclear retaliatory capability and United States-Allied tactical forces capable of fighting with or without atomic weapons in defense of vital areas of the globe.

¹⁸ "Limited War," *The Atlantic*, May, 1959, p. 43.

(Continued from page 219)
ment declaring their support for our policies, the better. While once we were, on principle, against all "entangling alliances," now we are, again on principle, in favor of all alliances.

Alliances: Pro and Con

Alliances comprise effective policies when the task is military and the mutual interest in defense is clear. Such factors alone permit Nato to exist as a useful, even necessary, organization. But in Asia the pressures against the *status quo* are predominantly internal and political, not external and military. Amid such circumstances an alliance not only serves no useful purpose but demonstrates an unwillingness to recognize the legitimacy of change itself. It substitutes a collection of signatures for the precise political analysis required to judge the quality and direction of change.

Even in matters of military defense, it is difficult to see how the threat of massive retaliation in Asia can be more effective in the future than in the past. Alliances and the threat of atomic reprisal together spell out a conviction that there cannot be revolution that does not emanate from Peking or Moscow. Thus American alliances in Asia, except in certain exposed areas, simply implement a policy of anti-communism. Such denial of the genuine force of nationalism commits the nation to a *status quo* which is beyond its interest and its power to maintain.

"... It is . . . my belief that . . . we shall have need of all our spiritual vigor to meet successfully the fearsome problems of the world of the nineteen sixties.

"... Within the span of a few years our nation's vast geographic barriers, behind which we grew safely to great-power status, have vanished. We now stand naked and exposed to foreign military dangers that we thought we would never be obliged to face. Yesterday we thought that non-involvement in world affairs would protect us. Today we have military installations scattered more or less permanently over a large part of the earth's surface. Yet despite this vast and expensive effort to protect ourselves we live under the menace of unimaginable destruction that could be brought to us by impersonal instruments dispatched from launching pads half way round the world. Yesterday we were unconcerned, in the matter of security, with political or economic events in most of the world. Today in remote Tibet, the jungles of Africa, or the tiniest islands off the Asian mainland every economic or political crisis is a matter of security concern to us.

"Hence, just past mid-century, we enter a new decade in a spirit of diminished national self-assurance. We are uncomfortable over the fact that in the years just past much of our policy has been a defensive reaction to the outward thrusting of Soviet expansionism."

—Grayson Kirk, President of Columbia University, January 7, 1960.

"The main effect of the [American] constitutional arrangements . . . has been to lodge the military establishment squarely in the middle of the built-in rivalries between the Congress and the White House for control of the executive branch, on the one hand, and of the legislative program on the other," writes this specialist, warning that "This is the persistent tendency of the separation of powers."

Civil-Military Relations in the United States

By HARVEY C. MANSFIELD

Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University

CIVIL-MILITARY relations present a special case of the more general problem of constitutional government in a democratic society: how to establish and maintain an organization of force sufficiently potent to be "adequate to the exigencies" of international insecurity, yet so securely controlled as not to endanger the domestic liberties and other prized goals of citizens. It is a special case because of the differences that arise from wearing a uniform and having a national monopoly in the weapons of war. It is a special case in this day and age because of the transformations in the technology of weapons and wars, and in the strategy of national security since the Russians developed their H-bombs and sputniks. It is a special case in the United States, with our particular

political traditions at home and our unique position in the world at large.

Civil-military relations pose problems in the status of civilians and soldiers in domestic society, and in the "status of forces" and of civilian dependents and employees stationed in foreign countries; in the relations of scientists, universities and business firms with the military departments; and in the organization and operation of the national government as a whole and of the defense establishment in particular. The focus of popular interest shifts from time to time, from universal military training to the trials of civilians in military courts and of soldiers in foreign courts, to the "conflicts of interest" of business executives turned government administrators, to the rivalries of the services for jurisdiction and appropriations. The search for enduring principles persists and is not satisfied by the easy repetition of the catchword "civilian control." What have we learned and what have we still to learn?

We have learned, to begin with, from two world wars, from cold war and the spread of Communist dominance and influences, that we must maintain very large military forces for a long time to come and improve our rate of technological advance; we cannot expect to dispose of civil-military relations by not having any military.

We have learned, too, that large military forces and their means of support cannot be wholly segregated and isolated, so kept out of the main stream of American life—as they were in the 1880's and again in the first decade of this century and in the Coolidge-Hoover-New Deal eras—as to be a negligible influence.

Harvey C. Mansfield, chairman of the political science department at Ohio State University from 1947 through 1959 and now a professor there, is co-author of *Arms and the State*, and Managing Editor of the *American Political Science Review*; he was on the resident civilian faculty of the National War College in 1953. He taught at Yale before the war and served on the staff of the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1936-1937. A wartime official in the Office of Price Administration, he became the agency's official historian. Mr. Mansfield has since been a consultant to a number of temporary governmental agencies, and is board chairman of the Inter-University Case Program.

Nor can they be kept purely instrumental, the politically inert implements of policy made elsewhere. On many matters they do not have the last word; and they can be counted on to carry out orders. But they do have views and feelings, and on matters that concern them they will be heard from, in one way or another. We cannot expect to dispose of civil-military relations by not having any relations. How can their influence be made at once properly effective where it is relevant, and subordinated where it should not be decisive?

I

An organized military force is a power. Political philosophers and constitution-makers over the centuries have thought of three alternative ways—not mutually exclusive—of controlling power, to prevent its abuse: (1) Tame it, by teaching those who hold it to hold also civic ideals that will make tyranny unthinkable for them; or better, by selecting only those to hold power who are already known to be trustworthy. So, George Washington was both the foremost American soldier of his time and also the national model of integrity. (2) Check it, by imposing above it a superior power, which can remedy an abuse or remove an abuser. So we make the actions of many administrative agencies subject to review in the courts; and so, too, we make the elected President the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. (3) Divide it up, and put the pieces in separate hands, so that the fragments will check each other and no one can assemble enough of it to be dangerous. On this theory we rest our basic constitutional arrangements, and on this theory also the friends of the three armed services argue that too much unification would be dangerous: we want no "all-powerful Prussian general staff."

There are difficulties with all three of these routes to safety. The first was the favorite of the natural law philosophers and it is still probably the most congenial solution as far as it is available. Military doctrine and education lay great stress on loyalty, discipline and "American ideals." But if frequently power has a sobering effect, sometimes power only corrupts. What institutions, what democratic electorate, what appointing officers,

can be depended on always to put only the trustworthy in positions of power and trust? And who can be sure in advance what men, once in power, will not succumb to temptations or be misled?

The second way only pushes the question a stage further back: who will control the controller? And in the case of military power, with a legal monopoly of force in its hands, there is a special difficulty: any "superior" power to check it must be legal or moral or psychological, for there is no superior physical force in the country. An army can overturn a government if it wills, unless the population goes on strike. Which drives us back to the first way, or on to the third.

The difficulties with the third are practical, the dispersion of responsibility and the possibilities of cross-purposes, stalemate and inaction when authority is divided. This may defeat the purpose for which the power was established in the first place. Unity of command in the field is therefore accepted military doctrine, honored whenever the stakes are high; the lack of it at headquarters is a perennial ground for complaint against Defense Department organization.

II

The framers of our Constitution knew two kinds of military forces, a militia and a standing army, and had no doubt of their strong preference for the one and distrust of the other. The militia was a roster of the able-bodied men in the community, who were under obligation to provide their own arms and to respond for limited periods of duty on proper call. This was the appropriate force for a republic, for, as it consisted of a cross-section of the citizenry, so it would be animated by the same sentiments that imbued the whole community; it would have no vested interests and present no dangers. A standing army, on the contrary, with its sharp class distinctions between officers and men smacked of aristocracy, Europe and despotism. Yet it was foreseen that in the prevailing state of the union some permanent forces would need to be stationed at interior points along the frontiers. Britain held Canada and Louisiana, and Spain, Florida; and there were the Indians. A permanent force would have to be national unless each state was to

maintain a standing army. And if a national force was provided, should commissions in it be foreclosed to members of Congress? How could the interests of the states best be protected?

Out of a variety of such considerations came a balanced series of compromises in the language of the Constitution.¹ Some of the constitutional language has become obsolete, some of it has had unanticipated consequences; taken together its net effect has been to guarantee (1) that while civilians will control many decisions, both important and trivial, in military affairs, it is seldom clear in advance which civilian office will control which decision; and (2) that top military officers will inevitably be drawn into the politics of executive-congressional and national-state relations.

Obsolete is the proviso attached to the congressional power to raise and support armies, that "no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years." This has been construed into innocuous desuetude. Obsolete too is the attraction of the militia. Militia forces, under state control in peacetime and under a dual national-state control in wartime, proved inadequate to their tasks on each of the nineteenth century occasions when they were called into national service. They have been replaced, since the Dick Act of 1903, by the National Guard, which gets federal funds for maintenance and training and operates under dual control in peacetime and national control in wartime. But the militia clauses survive to buttress the National Guard Association's lobbying in Congress; in their name it has successfully resisted all regular army and Pentagon efforts to consolidate it into a unified national reserve under army control. In peacetime the National Guard is now seldom called, as it often used to be, to intervene in labor disputes; instead it has taken advantage of its federally-furnished equipment to acquire a reputation for rescue work when natural disasters strike—in floods, blizzards and earthquakes. But it remains a vehicle for state patronage.

An unanticipated consequence has been the elaboration, since Lincoln's time, of a vague and expanding interpretation of the commander-in-chief clause to justify emer-

gency actions of the President, sometimes only indirectly connected with military affairs. This has been possible because the constitutional phrasing confers an office on the president without further defining its functions or powers. Franklin Roosevelt relied on it not only to sanction his destroyers-for-bases agreement with Churchill but also to enforce wartime wage settlements, as when he directed the Army to oust a recalcitrant Sewell Avery from Montgomery Ward's front office.

The main effect of the constitutional arrangements, however, has been to lodge the military establishment squarely in the middle of the built-in rivalries between the Congress and the White House for control of the executive branch, on the one hand, and of the legislative program on the other. This is the persistent tendency of the separation of powers. On questions of force levels and strategy, of the deployment of forces and investments in expensive facilities and installations, and of the organization of the military establishment, Congress—or more accurately, the Armed Services and other committees—and the Administration are regularly at odds, and each seeks to buttress its position by enlisting the testimony of senior officers. The other side of this coin is to be seen in the efforts of the professional soldiers to mobilize support for their views at one end of Pennsylvania Avenue or the other, as opportunity offers. In this process the commander-in-chief clause, and the present position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and of the service chiefs individually in their separate departments—frequently permit the by-passing of the civilian department heads. The result is civilian supremacy (but not necessarily effective civilian control), and service rivalries erupting into domestic politics.

III

The world of the framers is gone. We have had a permanent national military force since the end of the eighteenth century, and the problems it has posed have generally had little to do with the framers' concern over the dangers of tyranny. Instead, American military traditions developed characteristics during the nineteenth century that in some ways strikingly paralleled or anticipated distinctive

¹ See Fitzpatrick, above.

developments in the federal civilian bureaucracy.

Sooner than on the civilian side, but in the spirit that later animated it, e.g., the agricultural bureaus, the Army cultivated technical skills. West Point, founded by Jefferson in 1802, stressed mathematics and engineering rather than strategy. From its establishment until the outbreak of the Civil War it produced no generals but a number of railroad presidents—and the Corps of Engineers which, down to World War II, continued to draw off the cream of the Academy's graduating classes.

In a contrasting development, the same Jacksonian impulses that introduced the spoils system into civilian politics led frequently, in the middle years of the century, to the election of company and battalion officers and to political appointments to the higher grades; most generals before 1861 came into the service by political appointment without previous military experience. The system of congressional appointments to the academies reflected similar underlying assumptions.

Finally, in the later years of the century, civil service reform was paralleled by the growth of career professionalism in the military services. But where the civil service was then rapidly expanding, contraction was the military lot until the Spanish War. And where expansion opened up opportunities for advancement, professional control of military promotions entrenched the seniority rule. By the outbreak of the Spanish War, the Army and Navy led a life detached from the main concerns of the country. Paradoxically, they were freer to govern their own affairs at the same time that they were the objects of the hostility both of the business community, which was pacifist and isolationist because of its preoccupation with industrial development, and of the liberal anti-military tradition that culminated in Bryan and Wilson. Yet the professional soldiers were perhaps the least bellicose element in American society then and later, and until the end of the 1930's—World War I apart—among the least consequential.

IV

Occasions recur, but not often, when the armed might of the nation is turned against

a defiant segment of the domestic population, to vindicate some stand that presumably has majority support across the country. The most dramatic example in the interwar period before 1939 came in the last week of July, 1932: General MacArthur, then Army Chief of Staff, at President Hoover's direction personally led a full-dress military action, launched at the foot of the Washington Monument, to drive the "bonus-marchers" out of Washington and away from the Anacostia flats across the river. A generation later paratroopers were sent to Little Rock. Such cases remind us of the latent possibility that civil-military relations may in part be openly hostile. But they teach, too, that when that happens the trouble is not with the military; instead, a failure of civilian processes is acknowledged. Our main concerns in the field today have to do, not with the alienation, but with the mingling of military and civilian elements.

V

At the bottom of the hierarchy, soldiers in uniform are sharply segregated from the rest of society. The uniform itself accomplishes this in part. Housing and employment on military bases surrounded by wire fences and monitored by sentries reinforce the separation. (No modern commander would want to violate the prohibition embodied in the Third Amendment to the Constitution, that "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner. . . .") Most of all, the system of discipline that vests in his commanding officer the disposal of all his waking and sleeping hours sets the soldier apart. The government must accordingly provide not only for his shelter, food and work, but also for his health and further education, his family, his social security, his leisure, even for his misbehavior—for virtually everything. Temporary leaves, reenlistment bounties, veterans' benefits, the G.I. Bill and the Uniform Code of Military Justice adopted in 1950 are all measures designed to reconcile the democratic ideals with the authoritarian organization. Racial discrimination has been abolished, and an approach to the equality of the sexes finds expression in the establishment of women's divisions and the commissioning of women as officers up to the rank of colonel.

It is not surprising that the result of all this should bear some resemblance to socialism. The army as an organization is anxious to please, yet an army in peacetime is by definition partially unemployed, and it can scarcely hope to please everyone. So retail merchants complain of PX privileges and prices, doctors complain of the doctors' draft and, though soldiers do not vote, their families write letters to congressmen. Taxpayers, on the other hand, complain when fringe benefits are converted to private uses. And though there are no American civilian courts abroad, the Supreme Court has recently ruled that military tribunals cannot constitutionally try civilian dependents and employees for their crimes, even murder.

We have made progress, but still have not fully learned how to accommodate a large permanent military force congenially to the standards and amenities of a prosperous civil society. In particular, and in spite of much debate and some experiments with the draft, UMT proposals, compulsory ROTC, reserve schemes and pay improvements, we have not yet learned how to apportion fairly the burdens of the military service that in theory is the obligation of all competent adults and in practice is inevitably the lot or choice of only some of them.

VI

At the top of the hierarchy and in its upper reaches, officers, politicians and statesmen, business executives, lobbyists, scientists and educators and newsmen meet and mingle freely at work, at home and at play. The problem here is not the reconciliation of two different ways of ordinary life that proceed from very different basic assumptions about individual purposes. It is rather the fusion in "proper" proportions of strongly held and sharply competing views about national policy, the organization and emphasis of administration, and who should be in charge of what.

In the evolution of army organization since Secretary of War Elihu Root secured the passage of the General Staff Act of 1903, the Chief of Staff became the effective military commander in the department (except for the Corps of Engineers in rivers and harbors work) as well as the Secretary's principal military adviser; while the civilian Assistant

Secretary concerned himself with army logistics. A working alliance between the Secretary and the Chief of Staff against all outsiders (president, congress, navy, state *et al.*) emerged as a normal pattern. The navy, by a very different route, arrived at much the same result in World War II when Admiral King combined the posts of Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief of the Fleet, and so for the first time subordinated both the shore bureaus and the fleet to a unified naval command, while Undersecretary Forrestal addressed himself to the civilian side of departmental business. Under strong leadership it was an effective arrangement for the two departments; it was inadequate for affairs of government-wide scope.

On the military side the balance of power was tipped in favor of the service chiefs when President Roosevelt in 1939 ordered them to report directly to him, and again in early 1942 when he constituted them the Joint Chiefs of Staff; still more so in 1947 when Congress in the Unification Act gave permanent statutory recognition to them and their military planning staff. JCS is a closed, corporate, self-protective command structure, controlling all the armed forces, served by an unmatched system of communications, able to bypass the civilian secretaries and undersecretaries and to plead national security for the secrecy of its files; and it consists of able and dedicated men. But a condition of its power is the ability of its members to agree among themselves, for a chief cannot yield to his peers on a matter of vital interest to his service and still retain his authority in that service. And events have combined to aggravate interservice rivalries: the new technology of weapons systems that has made obsolete the convenient old division of jurisdiction according to the elements of land, sea and air; the higher stakes on the "delicate balance of terror"; and the pressure of budgetary ceilings. Outside the armed services JCS enjoys no undisputed rule.

On the civilian side no corresponding concentration of power has developed. The Unification Act inserted a new layer in the hierarchy by creating the office of Secretary of Defense, and thereby downgraded the three service Secretaries and their assistants without making the newcomer a match for JCS. The amendments of 1949, the reorgan-

ization of 1953 and the amendments of 1958 have strengthened his position but he still gives his attention to management and logistics rather than strategy; and his civilian assistants from the business world come and go with disconcerting frequency. Research and development are largely contracted out to private firms and universities; and scientists have found no congenial home in his department.

Atomic Energy and the Space Agency are linked to Defense but have autonomous civilian heads. The State Department has recovered from its wartime eclipse, and finds its tasks complicated by the need to oversee the USIA and ICA; its new reliance on the instrument of foreign aid puts its interests at odds with the Treasury, which has also gained in influence, at the same time that it must seek for common ground with Defense in Nato. Central Intelligence serves all three and is mastered by none. Congress still functions, and the press and TV compete for

coverage while lobbyists work in the wings. In this array of opinion and will, how are civil and military policy elements fused?

In the theory of our Constitution the final power oscillates between Congress and the President; plainly today neither can regularly cope with the task unaided. In the theory of the Unification Act the responsibility for concerting civil-military policy is lodged with the National Security Council, but little in the experience of the cabinet and other inter-departmental committees warrants optimism that the NSC can compose deeply felt differences. Our military leaders in two decades have come a long way in their appreciation of the force of extra-military considerations. Not many civilians have developed a comparable grasp of weapons technology and strategy. We have yet to learn how best to articulate our institutions, civil and military, so that the power to decide, and the knowledge to decide wisely in the light of the relevant available evidence, go hand in hand.

"On August 29, 1949, when the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic device, a new era began in the long history of the relations between politics and force. During the ensuing decade the pace of political and technological change has been so swift that men are now beginning to say that we have reached the end of the era that began in 1949.

"One general judgment of the era is becoming increasingly common. We now realize that the immense drive to arm the United States with nuclear weapons and delivery systems has not been guided and controlled by a clear and practical national purpose. In particular, five criticisms are gaining currency.

"First, our armament effort has been wrongly subject to the domination of technology. We have failed to submit technological possibilities to the criterion of military and political usefulness. Second, the result has been an emphasis on the strategy of unlimited war, as exhibited in the concept of massive retaliation. Third, the further result has been a complete divorce between military strategy and political aims. Our dominant military strategy and its supporting arms look to the release of unlimited power, whereas our political aims, whatever they may be, are certainly not unlimited. Fourth, and again in consequence, in the very midst of the enormous power-struggle now going on in the world arena, our foreign policies lack the necessary support of force. Our military 'strength' has degenerated into a mere capacity to wreak unlimited nuclear violence, which is politically useless; and this very capacity inhibits us from the use of limited force, which may be politically necessary. Fifth, this whole disorderly structure of policy stands under the final peril, which is a lack of moral sanction. It is against the dictates of reason that military strategy should accept the control of technology. Politics, not technology, is the rightful master of military doctrine. It is also against the dictates of reason that the use of force, which may be the necessary instrument of justice, should suffer moral degradation and become a sheer exercise in violence, which can serve no moral or political purposes."

—Thomas E. Murray, Consultant to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in an address delivered in California, December 9, 1959.

Note that "The formal bid system simply cannot cope with many of the problems of developing and building highly sophisticated missiles and aircraft," this specialist evaluates the negotiated contract and the "weapons-system concept" as methods of military procurement.

Conflicts in Military Procurement

By BERNARD K. GORDON

Instructor in Political Science, Vanderbilt University

A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE, concerned over the high costs of the military program, was uncovering evidence of collusion between high army officials and private suppliers. At the same time, a manufacturer's representative boasted that "You can sell anything to the government at almost any price you've got the guts to ask." The speaker was Jim Fisk, and it was the decade of the '60's—the 1860's.

The basic problems of military procurement are not altogether different in the 1960's, but they are far more complex and enormously altered in magnitude. The sheer immensity of military purchasing must be made clear at the outset. Amounting to between \$21 billion and \$24 billion annually, or more than half the defense budget, the purchases of the armed services make them the nation's largest single buyer of goods and services. Thus the economic impact alone is enormous, and the historical and political context of military procurement forces this to be a problem of central focus.

Historically, the belief that fraud, favoritism and loose practices have traditionally

accompanied American military procurement is not entirely unfounded. Dating from Eli Whitney's difficulties with dishonest contracting officials in the early days of the Republic, to Civil War scandals concerning the sale of everything from rifles to railroad space, and most recently to an instance of a nine million dollar overcharge by one company, it is perhaps understandable that congressmen are sometimes pedantic about the details of military appropriations. It is unfortunate for the morale of present-day procurement officials, but this legacy of past malpractices has never quite died. In 1959, when a House subcommittee investigated the entertaining of officers by the aircraft and missile industries, memories of a "munitions lobby" and the Nye Committee leapt into many minds.

Dispassionate consideration of military buying is further complicated by the number of widely-held values which come into direct conflict on procurement policy. Often this conflict is very clear; for example, the desire for military economy and non-inflated inventories vs. the desire to have plenty of everything on hand when it is most needed. Thus, when it seemed that troops in Korea were short on ammunition, shock was expressed that the armed services had not supplied themselves adequately. But just as many Americans were quick to point an accusing finger when it was learned than an Air Force base had an inventory seemingly 33 per cent higher than its needs.¹

Other value-conflicts are no less apparent: the desire to give firm specifications to a contractor vs. the goal of allowing the company

Bernard K. Gordon has been a Research Fellow at the Defense Studies Program, Harvard, and has served as National Defense Analyst with the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. His most recent publications include: *Civil Defense in Western Europe and the Soviet Union* (co-author), and "NATO's Missing Shield," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (June 1959).

¹ *The Washington Post*, 12 September, 1957.

with "know-how" to find the best manufacturing technique; the belief that "excess profits" should be curbed vs. the goal of encouraging traditional American incentive; the goal of encouraging small business vs. the certainty of performance and speed of delivery which the giant firms can best promise; and finally, the desire to buy at lowest price, which may be in conflict with the need to simplify procedures, the desire to diversify sources of supply for strategic and social reasons, as well as the American preference for supplying fighting men with the best and most modern equipment.

Few if any of these difficulties are totally new, although rapid changes in technology and the nature of possible future wars have made some of these old problems far more complex. By and large, however, the procurement problem is being met with attitudes and techniques which are the result of an earlier era. Thus today's procurement program is based almost entirely on 1947 legislation,² which in turn is the product of World War II and earlier experience.

Our Procurement Tradition

While the first procurement legislation dates from 1798, the pattern of American military purchasing remained basically unchanged until the eve of World War II. The fundamental principle was that of formal advertisements for bids, for which the government furnished detailed specifications of the desired equipment, followed by the award of a contract to the lowest responsible bidder. This procedure was designed to encourage the widest competition and was based on the principle that low price should be the governing factor. Although there were some exceptions—in 1907 the Wright brothers were given an "incentive" contract—formal bidding continued to be the usual practice until about 1940.

But bidding also assumes that detailed specifications for an item do exist and that they can be furnished openly. This puts the primary responsibility for the design of new equipment on the armed services, and assumes as well that secrecy is not a factor. It also assumes that there is ample time for the formal bidding process. By 1939 it was

clear that few of these conditions would continue to exist: in the navy, for example, the need to produce enormous quantities of equipment very quickly, and to keep certain designs secret, indicated that a departure from formal bidding was in order.³ And days after Pearl Harbor the rigid requirements of advertised-bidding were formally suspended by the First War Powers Act. The beginnings of the modern form of negotiated contract were underway, for this Act "conferred very broad procurement authority upon the executive agencies."⁴

The World War II experience, under both the advertised-bid and the negotiated form of contracting, is widely judged to have been satisfactory. Negotiated contracting meant that procurement officials hammered out the terms of price, delivery schedules and design in consultation with likely producers, and then awarded the contract to that firm which could best meet the government's needs. There is no doubt that this departure from the bidding system gave rise to many instances of excessive cost to the government, especially early in the war when there was little cost experience to serve as a guide. But it was overwhelmingly important to turn this country's massive industrial base to wartime production very quickly, and this was accomplished largely through a combination of incentives, rapid amortization, and exemption from price controls.

But if initial pricing was often liberal, a reasonable balance was later struck as a result of close pricing, the recapturing of "excess profits" by taxation, and by means of the renegotiation process. Renegotiation boards, later reviewing the wartime contracts, ultimately declared that \$10 billion to \$11 billion was "excess profits," and subject to recapture. Indeed, these boards were so careful that many producers came to feel that there was little point in trying to reduce costs, since the government would later take the extra returns anyway.⁵

Procurement in the Cold War

The increasing need to develop and build

² R. H. Connery, "Organizing the Navy's Industrial Mobilization," *Public Administration Review*, Autumn, 1945, p. 309.

⁴ Charles W. Colson and Murray Zweben, "An Analysis of Proposed Amendments to the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947," *George Washington Law Review*, April, 1959, p. 558.

⁵ John P. Miller, "Military Procurement Policies: World War II and Today," *American Economic Review*, XLII, May, 1952, p. 458.

² *Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947* (ch. 137, Title 10, U.S. Code).

highly complex weapons, and to build them quickly, has resulted in several unwanted consequences. Often only a handful of the largest firms have the facilities for producing the most modern weapons, with the result that smaller firms participate less each year as prime contractors. This has also meant a greater geographic concentration of defense production. Another more widely recognized result of the new complexity of military equipment is the increasing use of the negotiated form of contract, in contrast to the advertised-bid technique.

While the Armed Services Procurement Act clearly indicates that formal, advertised-bid contracts shall be the general rule, the overwhelming majority of military procurement actions today are not awarded in this manner. During 1956, for example, approximately 92 per cent of all military procurement, both in terms of dollar value and number of contracts, was by negotiation and not by bidding.⁶ More recently, Congressman Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee has estimated that in 1958 only \$3.4 billion of the total \$24 billion military procurement bill was awarded by bidding. This represented only 275,000 of the five million contracts awarded that year.⁷

There is of course nothing "illegal" about this procedure, for the same legislation that makes formal bidding the "rule" also allows for 17 categories of exceptions. For example, formal bids are not required for contracts where certain classified information is involved, where particularly quick results are required, or where the contract is for research. Critics contend that the military establishment has been far too liberal in interpreting these and other "exceptions," and that negotiated contracts often result in unnecessarily high costs to the government.

The General Accounting Office, the audit arm of the Congress, has been particularly active in pointing out such instances. It must be conceded that the negotiation process makes it possible for a producer to realize unusually high profits, either as a result of genuine errors in estimating costs, by willful overpricing, or by estimating costs before the economies of mass production are evident. In any case, the contracting official, who

must combine the talents of engineer, accountant, lawyer and Yankee trader, may be negotiating on the basis of inflated estimates. In two such cases recently the G.A.O. charged that the AC Spark Plug Company and the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation had overcharged the government by one million and six million dollars, respectively.⁸

In both these instances the primary indictment of the G.A.O. was directed at the armed services themselves, for not having exercised sufficient care in negotiating the contracts. Indeed, this indictment points to one of the ironies of the procurement process. Very often the contracting officials who bargain with industry's most experienced, senior, and talented representatives are themselves not very experienced younger men. Their civil service grades are usually in the \$6000-\$7000 class, and there is frequent turnover in their ranks. It is not surprising that some officials, having gained familiarity with the complex procurement process, have been induced to leave government service to sit on the other side of the bargaining table.

Yet even those critics who conclude that the negotiated contract has severe weaknesses—that it has become the "spawning ground for suspicion and fraud"—concede that it is often necessary. The formal bid system simply cannot cope with many of the problems of developing and building highly sophisticated missiles and aircraft. This is particularly true in an era when even the establishment of "requirements" is no longer exclusively a job for the military, as the following example will illustrate.

An important Air Force contract may have its genesis in an Air Force notice to the industry, asking for help in determining how best to meet a specific future military threat. This evaluation may result in industry suggestions in terms of ideas, time and costs, from which the Air Force will then establish its own "general operation requirement" for a specific weapons system. Broad specifications then go back to industry sources from which firmer proposals are sought. This stage of the process, called "pre-design preparation," ordinarily requires no less than one year and costs between \$50,000 and \$500,-

⁶ Colson and Zweben, p. 562.

⁷ *The New York Times*, 15 January, 1959.

⁸ *Washington Post and Times Herald*, 14 December, 1958 (AC case); and G.A.O. Report No. B132936, January, 1959 (McDonnell case).

000. The following, final stages are a series of study contracts, development contracts and finally a production award.⁸ What a contrast this is to the old way of determining the kind of gun, shoes or helmets needed, drawing up the detailed "specs," and then awarding a contract to the company which promised to fill the need at the lowest price!

The bidding method has come into disfavor not only because of its seeming obsolescence, but also because the negotiated contract is often far simpler to draw up and administer. Some procurement officials have concluded that the advertised-bid contracts are more trouble than they are worth, that, as one official remarked, 85 per cent of them "hit some kind of snag, thus increasing production costs in the long run."⁹ It is precisely this attitude which has prompted some congressmen to conclude that the armed services have resorted to the negotiated contract as an "easy out," and by so doing have abdicated their responsibility. And there are cases to support this contention, as the Army found after a Senator protested that far too high a price had been agreed on for some earth-moving equipment. When the Army re-announced the contract by competitive bidding it found that savings of \$1,142,000 resulted.¹⁰ It seems clear, therefore, that there is still a place in the procurement process for the bidden contract.

A New Procurement Method

The charge that the armed services have abdicated their responsibility is leveled not only at the technique of the negotiated contract, but at a whole new pattern of military procurement: "the weapons-system concept." Simply put, this means to view a weapon and its procurement in its entirety; including, in the case of missiles and aircraft, all the ground support, communications and training equipment, as well as the actual weapon itself. The impetus for this approach derived from a number of instances, some dangerous, in which the introduction of a mighty and important weapon was delayed

because a relatively minor component was not ready on time.

The weapons-system concept seeks to solve this problem and a number of others as well. Instead of the armed services signing many thousands of contracts for a single program, the key is to sign only one major contract with a single prime contractor who will then serve as over-all manager of the entire program. This contractor is made responsible for delivery times and costs, and is encouraged, by fiscal incentives, to be efficient and prudent in his choice of subcontractors.

Any discussion of this approach tends to bring into focus many of the most controversial aspects of all military procurement. Indeed, these may become the subject of wider public debate should S.500, a bill now pending before the Senate Armed Services Committee, come under serious consideration. Introduced by Senator Saltonstall last winter, this bill would place negotiated procurement on an equal legislative footing with bidding, and would greatly encourage wider use of the weapons-system approach.

Among the corollary subjects of debate which consideration of this bill may produce, we shall discuss the following most prominent ones: the contrast between "general performance specifications" and the traditional requirement for very detailed specifications; the continuation of renegotiation as a means of recapturing "excess profits"; and the future role of small business in military procurement.

It is clear that the Saltonstall bill, which has wide support from the largest firms engaged in defense production, is designed to do away with what industry regards as "over-detailed" specifications. There is no doubt that in numerous instances overly-detailed requirements have led to increased cost, delivery delays and funny stories about an 18-page specification for ping-pong balls. But it must be remembered that detailed specifications are a "must" for advertised-bid contracts, and since 1955, procurement officials are under even greater impetus to write detailed specifications, in order to encourage the widest number of firms to compete.¹¹

But considering only negotiated contracts

⁸ *Wall Street Journal*, "Pentagon Purchases," 16 January, 1958.

⁹ *Time*, 8 September, 1958. Also see: *Procurement Policies and Practices of the Department of Defense*, U.S. Cong., House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 1957, pp. 80-81.

¹⁰ *Wall Street Journal*, 16 January, 1958.

¹¹ This refers to an amendment to the Procurement Act (69 Stat. 551 [1955]).

for the moment, it is significant that procurement officials often do not welcome industrial requests to "give industry its own head." Under this plan the services would state only general performance requirements and would leave the private contractor to decide how best to build the equipment. Precisely this course was followed during the Korean hostilities when the Chrysler Corporation was given a heavy-tank contract. The results were not good: the tanks were not delivered on time, and when they did arrive they were found to be unacceptable. The company was not penalized, and indeed was the beneficiary of its own (or the Government's) mistakes, "for it received contracts to correct the deficiencies."¹² In Congress, memories of this widely-publicized "heavy-tank case" may well operate against the intent of the Saltonstall bill to encourage greater use of "general performance specifications."

A second goal of the bill, to divest the government of its power to renegotiate most contracts, may also run counter to some lessons from recent procurement history. We have already mentioned the use of renegotiation in World War II and its consequently good reputation. As a leading authority observed, "the results achieved by . . . renegotiation justified its use beyond question."¹³ Today, however, this technique has been heavily criticized by industry spokesmen on a number of counts, including the charges that it destroys incentives, is unfair and unnecessary, and is "alien to the free enterprise system."

A review of recent renegotiation actions, however, tends to give the impression that this remains an effective and powerful method for carrying out its purpose. In 1954 alone about \$130 million was recaptured, and during 1952-1954 one company (Boeing Aircraft) was required to return \$27.5 million. Even more recently the Ford Motor Company voluntarily refunded \$5 million on one contract, after the G.A.O. pointed out that its profit of \$21.9 million reflected a margin of 18.6 per cent, or double the initially agreed ratio.¹⁴

¹² *Military Tank Procurement*, Tenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations (House), 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 13-14.

¹³ George A. Lincoln, et al., *Economics of National Security* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 314.

¹⁴ U.S. Cong., House, Committee on Armed Services, *Report and hearings . . . under the authority of H. Res. 67*, August 14, 1957, Subcommittee proceedings no. 6, pp. 3221, 2332.

This is not to deny the existence of drawbacks in the renegotiation process; in particular, the long delays which industry must tolerate before profits are regarded as final. But it is difficult to accept industry's contention that renegotiation necessarily interferes with "incentives" in contracting. Honest savings resulting from efficient production are not the concern of the renegotiation boards—their mission is to frown only on "excess" profits. Industry has also complained that while renegotiation may have been acceptable in wartime, "it has become, in peacetime, nothing more than a retroactive tax."¹⁵ But it hardly seems correct to use the term "peacetime" in an era when the nation's military expenditures average 40 billion dollars.

Every discussion of the weapons-system concept, or of the Saltonstall bill, must also be concerned with the future procurement role of small business. For a number of important reasons Congress has generally sought to encourage smaller firms to participate in the military market, and has provided special assistance. Yet, just as the character of modern weapons has reduced the scope of formal advertising, so the great complexity of new weapons has made it increasingly difficult for smaller firms to play a role in military production. The giant firms have the large engineering staffs, the necessary financing, and the familiarity with procurement techniques, while some of the smaller firms find it difficult even to cope with the paperwork of contracting. From the viewpoint of the contracting official, moreover, dealing with the giant firms is simpler and quicker and provides a greater certainty of product quality. Finally, one large firm may be able to handle by itself all the research and production requirements which if parceled out to small business might require scores of individual contracting agreements.

These and other reasons have led to a constantly decreasing role for small business, which in 1957 received only 4.3 per cent of the prime research and development contracts (in terms of dollar value), while in 1958 the figure had dropped to barely 3 per cent. In production contracts a similar decrease was evident: from 19 per cent in 1957

¹⁵ *Missiles and Rockets*, 12 January, 1959, p. 13.

to 16 per cent in 1958.¹⁶ The prospects for reversing this trend are not bright, nor does it seem that the Saltonstall bill would help. For the weapons-system method, while it seems logically to favor greater participation by small business, has not done so in practice. One reason is that the prime contractor who acts as system manager, unlike government procurement officials, is not bound by the same legal requirements to favor small business. Secondly, there is an understandable tendency for the prime contractor and the major "subs" (who are themselves likely to be giants) to keep as much as possible of the contract for themselves or their subsidiaries. Finally, as Senators Humphrey and Smathers have shown, one result of past economy or "stretchout" programs was the annexation by the giant firms of work which, "prior to the cutback . . . was performed by small-business subcontractors."¹⁷

The problems of small-business participation help illustrate the conflicts inherent in procurement generally. In many cases the costs and delays of intensive screening of contracts are reducible by avoiding small business altogether; but the final actual cost-per-unit of product may be higher. Thus one comparison shows that similar items when procured by government directly cost only \$40, as against \$68 when procured by a contractor; \$43.25 as against \$72.00, and \$435 as against \$500.¹⁸ Moreover, most of

us share with Congress a disinclination to allow the billions of dollars of military business to become the almost-exclusive province of ten or a dozen giant firms. Yet at the same time Congress often castigates procurement officials for their "cold calculations" when contracts are not awarded in areas of unemployment, even though to do so would add millions to the cost. Ironically, Congress is also quick to point to the procurement program when attempts are made to pare the "fat" from the defense budget.

Security Defies Valuation

Many of the problems discussed here are rooted in the assumption that the armed forces can be run on the same set of principles that guide business. The two, however, are hardly comparable. It would be an absurdity in business if a complex and expensive machine were bought and never used. But American foreign and military policy today relies, correctly, on just that principle. Who can say that the B-36 was a failure simply because it never dropped a bomb in anger? If the B-36 deterred war for the few short years it was operational, it was entirely successful and worth many times its cost. Similarly, in terms of defense, time may be more precious than money. A weapon *now*, produced on a crash program full of mistakes, changes, and shocking waste, may be worth far more than the same weapon two years from now produced by careful, conservatively efficient procedures at one-tenth the cost.

¹⁶ *The Role of Small Business in Defense Missile Procurement*, Report of the Select Committee on Small Business (Senate), 85th Cong., 2d Sess., September 30, 1958, p. 2.

¹⁷ *Government Procurement Policies*, Report of the Select Committee on Small Business (Senate), 85th Cong., 1st Sess., December 30, 1957, p. 28.

¹⁸ Philip R. Wheeler, "The System Approach to Defense Contracting," *Armed Forces Management*, January, 1960, p. 29.

"In the final analysis, removal of the military obstacles to world peace—like all other obstacles—depends upon the growth and fruition of ideals in the hearts of men. The spiritual and intellectual field is the real battleground upon which the future of the world will ultimately be decided. It should be clearly evident, therefore, that the major task which devolves upon each one of us today is to utilize every talent we possess with the utmost vigor, vision, and creative imagination to help make the power of our American ideals and principles felt throughout the earth. There is nothing more important in this endeavor than developing in members of our rising generations a solemn sense of obligations of citizenship, and providing them with the spiritual and intellectual resources necessary to meet them."

—Wilbur M. Brucker, Secretary of the United States Army, in an address delivered in New York City, December 3, 1959.

Current Documents

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS ON LEAVING FOR LATIN AMERICA TRIP

On February 23, President Eisenhower left for a two week trip through Latin America. Before he left, he addressed the radio and television audience in the United States and Latin America and reiterated his belief that the United States is the strongest nation in the world. He assured Latin Americans of continuing United States' friendship. The complete text of his address follows:

My friends:

Early tomorrow I start a journey to several of our Latin-American neighbors, with three major purposes in mind.

These are: To learn more about our friends to the south; to assure them again that the United States seeks to cooperate with them in achieving a fuller life for everyone in this hemisphere; and to make clear our desire to work closely with them in the building of a universal peace with justice.

Our interest in our sister republics is of long standing, and of deep affection. This, in itself, is reason sufficient for this journey.

But in these days of world tension, of awakening ambitions and of problems caused by the growing interdependence of nations, it is vital for national partners to develop better understandings and to improve common programs.

The bonds among our American republics are not merely geographic; rather they are shared principles and convictions. Together we believe in God, in the dignity and rights of man, in peace with justice and in the right of every people to determine its own destiny. In such beliefs our friendship is rooted.

Yet even among close comrades, friendships too often seem to be taken for granted. We must not give our neighbors of Latin America cause to believe this about us.

So I shall reaffirm to our sister republics that we are steadfast in our purpose to work with them hand in hand in promoting the security and well-being of all peoples of this hemisphere.

To do so calls for a sustained effort that is, unfortunately, sometimes impeded by misunderstandings.

One such misunderstanding, at times voiced in Latin America, is that we have been so preoccupied with the menace of Communist imperialism and resulting problems of defense that we have tended to forget our southern neighbors.

Some have implied that our attention has been so much directed to security for ourselves, and to problems across the oceans to the West and East, that we neglect cooperation and progress within this hemisphere.

It is true that we have given first priority to world-wide measures for security against the possibility of military aggression. We have made many sacrifices to assure that this security is and will be maintained.

But I hope to make clear, on my journey, that our military programs at home and abroad have been designed for one purpose only—the maintenance of peace, as important to Latin America as to us.

That there is need for these programs, post-war history clearly proves.

For the first five years following World War II, we in the United States, hopeful of a global and durable peace, pursued a policy of virtual disarmament.

But the blockade of Berlin, the military weakness of our European friends living face to face with the Communist menace, and finally the Korean War—together with arrogant threats against other peaceful nations—belatedly made it clear to us that only under an umbrella of military strength could free nations hope to make progress toward an enduring and just peace. World uneasiness rose to the point of alarm.

Since then our nation has developed great arsenals of powerful weapons to sustain the

peace. We have created a great deterrent strength—so powerful as to command and to justify the respect of knowledgeable and unbiased observers here at home and abroad.

Our many hundreds of Air Force bombers deployed the world over—each capable of unleashing a frightful destruction—constitute a force far superior to any other, in numbers, in quality and in strategic location of bases.

We have, in addition, a powerful nuclear force in our aircraft carriers and in our host of widely deployed tactical aircraft. Adding constantly to these forces are advanced types of missiles steadily augmenting the armament of all ground and other military units.

As for longer-range ballistic missiles, from a standing start only five years ago, we have literally leaped forward in accomplishments no less than remarkable.

Our Atlas missile, already amazingly accurate, became operational last year. Missiles of intermediate range are in forward bases. The first Polaris missile submarine—an almost invulnerable weapon—will soon be at sea. New generations of long-range missiles are under urgent development.

Collectively, this is a force not unduly dependent upon any one weapon or any one service, not subject to elimination by sudden attack, buttressed by an industrial system unmatched on this earth, and unhesitatingly supported by a vigorous people determined to remain free. Strategically, that force is far better situated than any force that could be brought to bear against us.

As we have strengthened these defenses, we have helped to bolster our own and free world security by assisting in arming forty-two other nations—our associates in the defense of the free world.

Our part in this indispensable effort is our mutual security program. It makes possible a forward strategy of defense for the greater security of all, including our neighbors to the south.

I am certain that our Latin-American neighbors, as well as you here at home, understand the significance of all these facts.

We have forged a trustworthy shield of peace—an indestructible force of incalculable power, ample for today and constantly developing to meet the needs of tomorrow.

Today, in the presence of continuous threat, all of us can stand resolute and unafraid—

confident in America's might as an anchor of free-world security.

But we all recognize that peace and freedom cannot be forever sustained by weapons alone. There must be a free-world spirit and morale based upon the conviction that, for free men, life comprehends more than mere survival and bare security. Peoples everywhere must have opportunity to better themselves spiritually, intellectually, economically.

We earnestly seek to help our neighbors in this hemisphere achieve the progress they rightly desire.

We have sought to strengthen the Organization of American States and other cooperative groups which promote hemispheric progress and solidarity.

We have invested heavily in Latin-American enterprise.

Now credits, both public and private, are being made available in greater volume than ever before. Last year these approximated \$1 billion. Our outstanding loans and investments in Latin America now exceed \$11 billion.

With our sister republics, we have just established the Inter-American Development Bank. With them we hope this new \$1 billion institution will do much to accelerate economic growth.

Additionally, we have expanded technical cooperation programs throughout the Americas.

To improve our own knowledge of our neighbors' needs, we recently established a distinguished panel of private citizens under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State.

This National Advisory Committee will, by continuous study of inter-American affairs, help us at home better to cooperate with our Latin-American friends. Members of this committee will accompany me on my journey tomorrow.

This will be a busy trip, for our neighbors' problems are many and vexing—the lack of development capital, wide fluctuations in the prices of their export commodities, the need for common regional markets to foster efficiency and to attract new credits, the need to improve health, education, housing and transportation.

All these are certain to be subjects of discussion in each of the countries I visit.

And wherever I go I shall state again and

again the basic principles and attitudes that govern our country's relationships in this hemisphere.

For example:

Our good-partner policy is a permanent guide, encompassing nonintervention, mutual respect and juridical equality of states.

We wish, for every American nation, a rapid economic progress, with its blessings reaching all the people.

We are always eager to cooperate in fostering sound development within the limits of practical capabilities; further, we shall continue to urge every nation to join in help to the less fortunate.

We stand firmly by our pledge to help maintain the security of the Americas under the Rio treaty of 1947.

We declare our faith in the rule of law, our determination to abide by treaty commitments and our insistence that other nations do likewise.

We will do all we can to foster the triumph of human liberty throughout the hemisphere.

We condemn all efforts to undermine the democratic institutions of the Americas through coercion or subversion, and we abhor the use of the lie and distortion in relations among nations.

Very recently, in a faraway country that has never known freedom—one which today holds millions of humans in subjugation—impassioned language has been used to assert that the United States has held Latin America in a colonial relationship to ourselves.

That is a blatant falsehood.

"In modern management practice, in Government as in business, the budget is a device for forward planning. It tells us where we stand and where we expect to go. It is a selection of choices among competing demands for Government attention. It is a program for the use of the resources we have at our disposal. It is a summation of our responsibilities and our opportunities. Nowhere else in the setting of democratic government is there a comparable opportunity for us to judge ourselves as a Nation, to perceive what we stand for, or to restate our priorities for action."

"If we go about it in the right way, we can consider the Federal budget as a mirror of the great purposes which motivate us as a Nation. Conversely, the budget process makes it possible for us, through our representatives, to question and challenge the role of government in our society—to equate, if you will, things as they are with what we think they should be."

—Maurice H. Stans, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, in an address delivered in New York City, December 1, 1959.

In all history no nation has had a more honorable record in its dealings with other countries than has the United States.

The Philippines are independent today—by their own choice.

Alaska and Hawaii are now proud partners in our federated, democratic enterprise—by their own choice.

Puerto Rico is a commonwealth within the United States system—by its own choice.

After the two world wars and the Korean War, the United States did not annex a single additional acre, and it has sought no advantage of any kind at the expense of another.

And in all of Latin America, I repeat, we adhere honorably and persistently to the policy of nonintervention.

It is nonsense to charge that we hold—or that we desire to hold—any nation in colonial status.

These are but a few of the matters that friends in this hemisphere need to talk about. I look forward with the keenest pleasure to exchanging views with the Presidents of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, and with their colleagues.

It is my profound hope that, upon my return, I shall be able to report to you that the historic friendship and trust among the nations of this hemisphere have been strengthened, and that our common cause—justice and peace in freedom—has been reaffirmed and given new life.

Good evening, and to my Latin-American friends, Buenas tardes.

Received At Our Desk

AMERICA THE VINCIBLE. By EMMET JOHN HUGHES. (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959. 306 pages, \$3.95.)

Of the growing number of studies critical of American foreign policy, few approach the power and scope of Mr. Hughes' devastating work. The critique deserves particular attention because the author was, for several years, responsible for preparing statements on world affairs for President Eisenhower.

The themes are not new, but they seem fresh and original. Mr. Hughes holds that noble objectives, economic benevolence, and a preoccupation with political principles are not adequate substitutes for effective policies; nor do they assure victory. On the contrary, the partisan emphasis on political rhetoric has tended to confuse the issues and cloud the judgment of the policymakers. For example, he denounces the "simple-sounding promise and formula: 'negotiation from strength'" as an excuse for evading direct and sincere negotiations with the Soviet Union. He calls for liberation from the illusions engendered by tinsel truths: "that a free society assures strength and the rule of tyranny is a sign of weakness"; "that, in the affairs of nations, progress in the economic sphere assures stability in the political sphere"; and "that the conduct of negotiation between nations, through diplomacy, should never be secret."

Our "diplomacy of pretense and insufficiency" toward Communist China has been short-sighted and ill-conceived. We have equivocated to the brink of disaster, e.g., in 1958, "so ambivalent was American policy, so inarticulate was American diplomacy, that the American Ambassador in Indonesia was compelled to appeal, again and again, to Washington to discover and to speak its full mind." Many similar in-

stances are given. The picture which emerges is not encouraging.

The style is excessively aphoristic and alliterative. However, the analysis is brilliant. The message is clear: the United States must pursue its objectives more tenaciously and courageously for "our nation lives under no benign dispensation from such tragedy as has tormented and broken empires of past ages." It could happen to us.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

STALIN AND THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY: A Study in the Technology of Power. By ABDURAKHMAN AVTORKHANOV. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. 379 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.00.)

The value of this study is twofold: first, it is an absorbing historical account of the Stalinization of the C.P.S.U.; second, and perhaps more important, it is written by a former Soviet citizen and member of the Communist party, a graduate of the Institute of Red Professors in Moscow—a training ground for prospective Party theoreticians.

Mr. Avtorkhanov concentrates on the crucial decade from 1928 to 1938, a period of dramatic transformations in the Soviet Union, and one during which he was close to the key party personages. Though the author's seeming ability to recapture the substance of conversations held more than a generation ago may be questioned, there is little doubt as to the uniqueness of the narrative. It makes fascinating reading. He describes the background, rationale, and subsequent modification of Stalin's initial plan for the complete collectivization of agriculture, and the techniques used by Stalin to consolidate his grip over the party. "The dramatic inside struggle for

power in which Stalin gained the assistance of the right-wing opposition against the left, and then the assistance of the shattered remnants of the left against a real or imagined threat from the right," is developed clearly and forcibly. There are illuminating insights into the purges of the 1930's and the intrigues which dominated the apparatus.

Concluding chapters cover events up to 1959, "focusing on the dilemma currently facing the post-Stalin leadership: on the one hand, it must, for its own salvation, revamp the Stalinist machine—a machine painstakingly built by a master craftsman, but no longer applicable to the needs of the time; on the other, the reconstruction of so complex a machine may well wreck both the machine and its operators." A.Z.R.

A CHINESE VILLAGE IN EARLY COMMUNIST TRANSITION. By C. K. YANG. (Cambridge: The Technology Press, M.I.T., 1959. 284 pages, index, \$6.50.)

THE CHINESE FAMILY IN THE CHINESE REVOLUTION. By C. K. YANG. (Cambridge: The Technology Press, M.I.T., 1959. 246 pages, appendix and index, \$6.00.)

Dr. Yang has written two important studies. They deal with the transformation of traditional Chinese society. The first study focuses on the pre-Communist pattern of life of one village and the change wrought by the Communist revolution. In this respect Dr. Yang's research has charted unknown ground, for it systematically traces the structural and institutional changes which have accompanied the transition from the pre-Communist to the Communist period. Further, the village, as a functioning entity, is related to the regional and national community.

The focus of the second study is on the family system. "Dr. Yang shows us very convincingly that the old system generated very considerable tensions, both in the relation between generations and that between the sexes. As long as the old family system was reinforced by the old ideological, political, and class systems and certain features of a predominantly agricultural

economy, the consequences of this strain could be successfully counteracted and the system as a whole remain substantially unchanged." However, the stability of the traditional family pattern has been subjected to severe stresses since the late nineteenth century. The Communists have exploited this disequilibrium and accelerated the intensity and scope of the process of change. There are interesting, informative chapters on marriage, divorce, the improved status of women, changes in the family economic structure, the secularization of family life, and the destruction of the clan as a significant social organism.

Both studies are well-organized, lucidly presented, and impressively analytical. They are valuable additions to our knowledge of a rapidly changing, politically significant society.

A.Z.R.

DEFENCE AND SECURITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA. By a STUDY GROUP of the INDIAN COUNCIL of WORLD AFFAIRS. (New York: The Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958. 208 pages, appendix and index, \$3.25.)

The present book provides an interesting series of essays on the security and defense problems of the countries of the Indian Ocean area. It will be useful to students of South Asian affairs because the findings and conclusions represent the deliberations of Indian social scientists.

"The study opens with a survey of the geographical features of the region and the security problems resulting therefrom. It then goes on to deal with the economic base of military security—the vast disparity in its potential and actual resources, the limitations of the economic development and in particular industrial development, over-population, low standard of living, the inequitable land tenure system, and so forth. The third chapter leads with the human element in the military potential of the nation and attempts to highlight some of the demographic problems of the area and the conditions of their life, their outlook and aspirations, their attitude to security and defence problems and their morale. . . . The study closes with a lengthy analysis of the interests of outside Powers and regional problems of security. . . ." A.Z.R.

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of February, 1960, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

Feb. 8—The Arab League Council meets in Cairo to discuss the recent tension on the Israeli border. Eight of the 10 members attend; Tunisia and Iraq are not represented.

Feb. 29—The Arab League Council ends 3 weeks of secret talks. The Council's closing declaration criticizes Israeli plans to divert the Jordan River waters.

Berlin Crisis

Feb. 4—It is reported that the Western Allies will agree to East German control of Allied routes to Berlin if such control does not exceed that which the U.S.S.R. now exercises.

Feb. 15—West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer addresses 2,000 students in Cologne; he declares that if West Berlin's integrity is sacrificed in negotiations between the West and Russia, the West also runs the risk of losing West Germany.

Feb. 17—It is reported that the Western attempt to formulate a common stand on the West Berlin problem has not been successful. President Eisenhower says, in a press conference, that he expects that the Allied position on Berlin, as presented to a summit conference, would embody the British, French, U.S. and West German viewpoints.

Feb. 19—It is disclosed that Britain, France and the U.S., in letters to the Soviet military commander in East Germany, have protested over the passes issued to travel missions in Potsdam. The new passes are imprinted to read that they have been registered with the East German ministry of the interior. The Western Allies do not recognize the East German government.

Feb. 20—A Soviet official's statement, reported by a West German news agency, declares that while the U.S.S.R. finds its solution to the West Berlin problem the

"best," it is willing to work with the West to achieve a compromise agreement.

Feb. 23—The U.S. Secretary of State, Christian Herter, is reported to favor a referendum in both parts of Germany to see whether the German people favor the Soviet or Western proposals for settling the German problem.

Feb. 29—It is reported that the U.S. will permit its planes en route to Berlin to fly above the 10,000 foot limit imposed by the Soviet Union. As yet, the Russians have not received notification of the new Allied policy.

Disarmament

Feb. 10—The Soviet delegate to the Geneva disarmament talks, Semyon K. Tsarapkin, finds unacceptable U.S. and British proposals (not officially presented) to limit all nuclear tests to underground explosions equal to 20,000 tons of dynamite or less.

Feb. 11—The Western proposal to ban all but very small nuclear underground explosions is formally presented to the Geneva conferees. Tsarapkin disapproves of the proposal.

Feb. 12—Tsarapkin accuses the West of plotting to obstruct the Geneva conference on a nuclear test ban treaty.

Feb. 14—In Washington, Western delegates from Britain, France, Italy, Canada and the U.S. are meeting in preparation for a world disarmament conference in March with delegates from East Europe—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and the U.S.S.R. The Western conferees learn that the U.S. is not prepared to present a total disarmament program to them.

Feb. 16—The Soviet Union offers an inspection plan on nuclear blasts to allow the Western powers to investigate suspicious seismographic data that might indicate a nuclear explosion. However, there would be a quota on the number of yearly investigations.

Feb. 18—The Soviet Union rejects establishing robot control post stations to monitor a nuclear test ban.

Feb. 29—Western officials say that French objections still block a Western arms plan.

Latin America (See also *Costa Rica*)

Feb. 5—Felipe Herrera of Chile is elected president of the Inter-American Development Bank, which will give economic aid to needy Latin American countries.

Feb. 18—Seven member countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay and Peru—sign a treaty for a Latin American free trade zone. A 12-year period is agreed on for the removal of trade barriers.

Nato (See *West Germany*) Organization of American States

Feb. 5—Venezuelan Ambassador to the U.S. Dr. Marcos Falcon-Briceno announces that his country has asked the O.A.S. council to consider charges that the Dominican Republic disregards human rights in violation of the O.A.S. charter. (See also *Dominican Republic*.)

Feb. 11—The O.A.S. votes to put charges against the Dominican Republic before the Inter-American Peace Committee.

United Nations

Feb. 3—The U.S.S.R. says that the U.N. Committee on outer space should not start work until late March.

U.N. officials ask Israel and Syria to withdraw armed forces from the region in dispute southeast of the Sea of Galilee. (See also *Israel*.)

Feb. 4—U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold says that all over Africa it is hoped that foreign aid can be channeled through the U.N.

Feb. 10—The U.N. is asked by 20 African and Asian states to urge France to stop torturing Algerian war prisoners.

Feb. 18—Hammarskjold says the Middle East situation is "deteriorating."

Feb. 22—"Reliable sources" report that Cuba has written the other 81 members of the U.N. asking them to support her for a seat in the Security Council.

Warsaw Pact

Feb. 2—An agricultural conference of the Warsaw Pact powers opens in Moscow.

Feb. 3—It is reported that leaders from satellite East Europe have been meeting in secret session in Moscow since Feb. 1.

Feb. 5—The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact issues a declaration supporting Russian foreign policy and threatening to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. The signatories are the U.S.S.R., Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia.

West Europe

Feb. 4—Meeting in London, the 7 members of the Western European Union reaffirm their intention of maintaining close ties; this leaves Britain as a link between the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association (the Outer Seven).

Feb. 18—The Swedish Embassy announces that the permanent headquarters of the European Free Trade Association will be in Geneva.

ARGENTINA (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*, February 26 and 28)

Feb. 7—Secretary of the Navy Rear Admiral Gaston C. Clement announces that a search for a foreign submarine in Argentina's Golfo Nuevo is being conducted.

Feb. 14—Anti-submarine depth charges (flown in yesterday by U.S. planes) are dropped in the Golfo Nuevo in an attempt to force the unidentified submarine to surface.

Feb. 23—The Argentine Navy declares that the mystery submarine has succeeded in eluding its searchers.

AUSTRIA

Feb. 8—Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky, on a visit to London, opens talks with British officials.

Feb. 12—The People's party ends a 2-day national meeting. Chancellor Julius Raab is succeeded as party leader by Alfons Gorbach.

BELGIUM

Belgian Congo

Feb. 1—Minister for the Congo August de Schryver urges Congolese leaders to cooperate with the government in maintaining peace and order in the Congo.

Feb. 8—Belgian and Congolese delegates at the Brussels round-table conference agree

on a government for an independent Congo: a bicameral parliament to conduct national and foreign affairs and six provincial legislatures.

Feb. 10—Belgium Minister for the Congo de Schryver tells conferees that Belgium will offer a treaty of friendship and technical assistance to an independent Congo. Feb. 13—Congolese delegates at round-table talks in Brussels choose Luluabourg to serve as the capital of the Congo when it becomes independent on June 30.

Feb. 19—Belgian and Congolese round-table conferees agree on a 16-point program for establishing an independent Congo state June 30.

Feb. 20—The month-long Brussels round-table talks close.

BRAZIL

Feb. 12—War Minister Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott resigns to run as presidential candidate on the Social Democratic party ticket. Marshal Odylion Denys is named his successor.

Feb. 23—U.S. President Eisenhower arrives in Brasilia as his tour of Latin America begins.

Feb. 24—President Eisenhower, in Rio de Janeiro, tells the Brazilian Congress that the U.S. will not neglect "the American states" even while fulfilling its responsibilities elsewhere in the world.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Australia

Feb. 4—Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies succeeds Richard G. Casey as Minister for External Affairs.

Feb. 23—Import licensing ends for 90 per cent of Australian imports.

Canada

Feb. 2—United States-Canadian postal authorities meet to revise the postal convention.

Feb. 4—Budget estimates offered to Commons reveal plans for defense spending cuts and for reduced contributions to Nato.

Ghana

Feb. 13—Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah says that French assets in Ghana are to be frozen "until such time as the effects on

the population of Ghana of the present atomic explosion and future experiments" are known.

Great Britain

Feb. 8—Queen Elizabeth announces that aside from princes and princesses of the royal family her descendants will be known by the surname Mountbatten-Windsor.

Feb. 12—The National Union of Railwaymen calls off a nation-wide strike set for February 15; a pay rise of 5 per cent is retroactive to January 11.

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan returns from his African tour.

Feb. 17—The Government reveals U.S.-British agreement to set up a long-range radar station to give early warning of a Russian rocket attack on Britain.

Feb. 18—New defense budgets call for increased expenditures for air force and nuclear bomber squadrons.

Feb. 19—Queen Elizabeth II bears her third child and second son.

Feb. 26—Queen Elizabeth's sister, Princess Margaret, announces her engagement to a commoner, Antony Armstrong-Jones.

India

Feb. 3—An anti-Communist 3-party alliance wins in Kerala elections. Communists increase their share of the total vote.

Feb. 10—It is announced in Warsaw that a Polish steel mill will be built at Agra, India.

Feb. 11—in New Delhi, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev praises Indian neutrality.

Feb. 13—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru says he sees no common ground for negotiation with Red China over the border dispute.

Feb. 15—Nehru asks Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to visit New Delhi to discuss the border dispute.

Feb. 22—Nehru tells Parliament that the third Five Year Plan will cost double the total outlay for the Second Plan.

A coalition government is instituted in Kerala after six months of direct rule from New Delhi.

Pakistan

Feb. 15—It is announced that President Mohammad Ayub Khan received 95.62 per cent of the votes in a referendum held yesterday.

Commander-in-Chief of the Army Mohammad Musa pledges army support for Ayub.

Feb. 17—Ayub is sworn in as elected president. He announces formation of an 11-member commission to frame a new constitution.

Feb. 24—It is announced that the new capital of Pakistan will be called Islamabad.

South Africa

Feb. 1—Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd assures visiting British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of "genuine friendship."

Feb. 3—British Prime Minister Macmillan tells South Africa that her racial policies will not be supported by Britain.

Feb. 5—Macmillan ends his African tour and warns against extremism.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE Cyprus

Feb. 1—British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd tells Commons that postponement of Cyprus' independence is regarded as unfortunate but not disastrous; he intimates that Britain will make no further concessions.

Feb. 8—An official statement notes postponement of Cyprus' independence; no new date is set.

Feb. 9—The British House of Commons is forced into emergency debate on the Cyprus issue.

Feb. 11—A draft constitution for Cyprus is completed.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Feb. 16—The Monckton Commission opens a 3-month inquiry into conditions in the Federation.

Kenya

Feb. 15—A statement issued by the Colonial Office reveals that major delegations at the Kenya constitutional conference accept "with reservations" British suggestions to enlarge the African vote before the next election as a way to lead Kenya toward independence.

Feb. 21—Bypassing a decision to safeguard against the expropriation of minority land holdings, the Kenya constitutional convention ends.

Maldives Islands

Feb. 3—A dispute with Britain over the use of Gan island as a British air base is settled.

Feb. 14—Britain and the Maldives Islands sign a treaty guaranteeing British use of Gan Island as an air base for 30 years.

Nigeria

Feb. 10—Prime Minister Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello of Northern Nigeria warns missionaries to abstain from political activities.

Feb. 22—Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa takes over the Ministries of Defense and Police.

Somaliland, British

Feb. 17—An election is held for a new Legislative Council of 33 elected members and three government-named members.

Feb. 28—Governor Sir Douglas Hall names four ministers recommended by the Somali National League to the new Legislative Council; the league won 20 out of 33 seats in the February 17 elections; the Somali party won 12; the National United Front, 1.

BURMA

Feb. 6—General elections for the lower house of the Burmese parliament are held.

Feb. 7—Former Premier U Nu's "clean" faction of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League is reported leading in results tallied thus far from yesterday's elections.

Feb. 8—It is reported that U Nu's faction has captured 120 of the 228 seats in the Chamber of Deputies from returns counted. Former Premier Ba Swe, heading the "stable" faction of the A.F.P.F.L., has won 18 seats.

Feb. 16—Soviet Premier Khrushchev stops over en route to Indonesia.

CHILE

Feb. 29—Chilean crowds welcome President Eisenhower.

CHINA (Nationalist)

Feb. 5—It is announced that Red Chinese shelled a Nationalist warship on patrol yesterday.

Feb. 20—Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek tells the National Assembly, at its opening meeting, that he regrets his failure to re-

cover the Chinese Mainland. In the 1948 election, Chiang promised to retake the mainland.

Feb. 28—Chiang tells Kuomintang party members in the National Assembly to follow party policy in suspending the 2-term presidential limit. Chiang, who is up for the prohibited third term, wants the constitutional restriction waived, but not revised.

CHINA (People's Republic of)

Feb. 19—The Indian government opens investigation of reputed Communist Chinese troops' seizure of salt mines in Chantham, in south Kashmir.

Feb. 28—The Chinese news agency, *Hsin-hua*, reports that Red Chinese Premier Chou En-lai has accepted Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's invitation to visit India for talks on their border dispute.

COSTA RICA

Feb. 15—President Mario Echandi Jiménez lashes out against the common market agreement among El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras; if Costa Rica and Nicaragua are excluded from joining, he warns, they will try to establish such an agreement with Panama.

CUBA

Feb. 4—A First Deputy Soviet Premier, Anastas I. Mikoyan, arrives in Cuba to open the Soviet exhibition in Havana.

It is reported that the U.S. has rejected the Brazilian good offices offer to help repair the breach in U.S.-Cuban relations.

Feb. 5—Police dispel anti-Communist demonstrators.

Mikoyan opens the Soviet exhibition.

Feb. 10—Prisoners taken last August are sentenced by a military court; there are 104 convictions and 36 acquittals. The property of those convicted is ordered confiscated.

It is disclosed that the Soviet order for 345,000 tons of Cuban sugar, purchased on February 5, is at 2.78 cents per pound. (The world price is 2.9 cents, the U.S. price, 5.11 cents.)

Feb. 13—Cuba and the U.S.S.R. sign an agreement whereby Russia lends \$100

million to Cuba and will also buy 5 million tons of Cuban sugar during the five-year period, 1960-1964.

Feb. 18—The Soviet trade agreement with Cuba, signed February 13 between Premier Fidel Castro and Mikoyan, is made public: the U.S.S.R. will supply Cuba with commodities such as crude and refined petroleum, wheat, pig iron and many others. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Feb. 19—The U.S. State Department announces that it has sent its regrets to the Cuban government over the plane which crashed yesterday 100 miles outside of Havana. The plane was carrying explosives, en route from Florida.

Feb. 20—The Cabinet approves the establishment of a "central planning board" which will coordinate the economy, including the regulation of private business.

Feb. 21—A plane bombs a Havana industrial suburb.

Feb. 22—Cuba's Minister of Foreign Relations Paul Roa offers to negotiate with the U.S. over the breakdown in friendly relations.

Feb. 23—The U.S. announces that it is willing to negotiate with Cuba over recent differences.

Feb. 25—Castro declares that foreign investment capital will be invested by the government, and will no longer be controlled by foreign investors.

Feb. 26—The State Department announces that military aid to Cuba (and to the Dominican Republic) will halt July 1, and that extension of this assistance is not intended.

Feb. 29—The U.S. announces that it is willing to discuss differences with Cuba, but not according to conditions specified by Cuba. Cuba wants U.S. guarantees that it will not reduce the amount of sugar that Cuba is allowed to sell on the U.S. market during the talks. Cuba receives two cents more per pound for sugar on the U.S. market than at world prices.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Feb. 19—It is announced by *Tass* that Mikhail V. Zimyanin has been named the new ambassador to Czechoslovakia, replacing Ivan T. Grishin.

DENMARK

Feb. 21—Viggo Kampmann, finance minister and Social Democratic party member, is named to succeed H. C. Hansen as premier. Hansen, who had been ill, died two days ago.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (See also *Cuba*, February 26)

Feb. 3—It is disclosed that the six Roman Catholic bishops of the Dominican Republic issued a pastoral letter which criticized the government for denying its citizens their individual liberties.

Feb. 11—In the third trial since the beginning of wholesale arrests in January, 40 more persons are given 30-year sentences, making a total of 120 tried and imprisoned in the last 10 days.

Feb. 15—The O.A.S. Council votes to have its Peace Committee investigate Venezuelan charges that the Dominican Republic is violating human rights. (See also *International, O.A.S.*)

Feb. 18—Rafael Herrera, the editor of *El Caribe* (pro-Trujillo paper), is replaced.

Feb. 24—Seventeen persons, among whom are 15 students, take shelter in the Brazilian Embassy in Ciudad Trujillo, where they seek political asylum.

FRANCE

Feb. 2—It is disclosed that 2 members of the French Assembly have been arrested in an effort to clamp down on leaders of the rightist insurrection in Algeria.

Feb. 3—The National Assembly votes, 449-79, to grant emergency powers to govern by decree to the French government so that it may cope with the Algerian situation.

The French Senate approves the grant of power to the French government to rule by decree for one year. The new measure permits the government, with the approval of the President, to issue decrees to preserve the security of metropolitan France and France in Algeria.

Feb. 5—President Charles de Gaulle reorganizes his Cabinet. Jacques Soustelle, a French rightist who demands that Algeria remain under French rule, is removed as Minister Delegate in charge of overseas departments and of the atomic and Sahara questions.

Feb. 11—Farmers and policemen clash in

Amiens. Farmers are agitating to protest the government's recent removal of farm items from the price index, which keeps agricultural prices in line with other basic items.

Feb. 12—France issues a warning that tomorrow morning restrictions on plane flights over the Sahara will take effect in preparation for an atomic explosion.

Feb. 13—France successfully explodes its first atomic bomb in the Sahara.

Feb. 27—De Gaulle asserts that he would be only too willing to drop atomic defenses if other countries did so; otherwise France must be able to protect itself.

FRANCE OVERSEAS**Algeria**

Feb. 1—European insurgents in Algeria surrender under an agreement negotiated last night. Pierre Lagaille, head of the insurgent barricade in Algiers, is taken to Paris by plane. The main body of the insurgent group is allowed to return home or to become attached to the Foreign Legion.

Feb. 4—An investigation into the Algerian insurrection opens.

Six political groups which have participated in the Algerian insurrection are banned or ordered dissolved.

Feb. 6—Three ministers in the French Cabinet arrive in Algiers to oversee reputed changes in the Algerian administration, military and judiciary.

Feb. 8—Alain de Sérigny, publisher of *L'Echo d'Algier* (conservative newspaper of the European group), is sent to Barberousse Prison.

Feb. 10—De Gaulle's government enacts civil and military reorganizations in Algeria. The Home Guard is dissolved.

Feb. 11—An Algerian nationalist source reports that the Algerians are pleased by the government's restrictive actions against the Europeans and that the Algerian nationalists are willing to discuss a peace in Algeria.

Feb. 14—De Gaulle establishes a Cabinet Committee of Algerian Affairs under his direction.

Feb. 17—Algerian National Rebel Government President Ferhat Abbas urges Algerian Europeans to cooperate in paving the way for self-determination for Algeria.

Feb. 25—President Charles de Gaulle in an address made during his tour in South France tells Algerian rebels that as soon as the "throat-cutting and fighting" end, plans for Algerian self-determination can proceed.

Feb. 28—The French army reports that it has executed 6 Algerian Muslim terrorists during the past two days.

Feb. 29—An "authoritative interpretation" of a statement by the Algerian Provisional Government President, Ferhat Abbas, reveals that he is willing to meet for talks in Paris on self-determination guarantees.

FRENCH COMMUNITY, The Cameroon

Feb. 20—It is reported that 62 persons were killed in clashes between security troops and terrorists.

Feb. 21—Cameroonians vote on a referendum to approve a constitution drafted by Premier Ahmadou Ahidjo.

Feb. 22—Incomplete returns show a majority of votes for the new constitution, which provides for strong presidential government.

Feb. 25—The Cameroon People's Union opposition party, headed by Felix Moumie, is given legal status. The party had been banned for 5 years.

Malagasy

Feb. 5—President Philibert Tsiranana arrives in Paris to negotiate for full independence for the Malagasy Republic. He will not forsake the French Community.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (WEST)

Feb. 6—Two men who defaced the Cologne synagogue last Christmas morning are sentenced for "anti-Semitic vandalism."

Feb. 25—Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss tells the Parliament Defense Committee that West Germany will not set up bases in Spain without seeking the approval of its allies.

It is reported that the United States has told West Germany that it does not approve of unilateral negotiation to set up "storage depots or air-training sites in Spain."

Feb. 21—It is reported that West Germany is negotiating with Spain for depot and training bases.

GERMANY, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (EAST)

Feb. 23—The official East German news agency, the A.D.N., announces that proceedings are being instituted to bring Bishop Otto Dibelius to trial.

GUATEMALA

Feb. 29—The British Foreign Office announces that Britain does not recognize Guatemala's claim to British Honduras (Belize).

ICELAND

Feb. 20—It is announced that the O.E.E.C. and the International Monetary Fund will give \$20 million in aid to Iceland.

Feb. 22—The government announces an increase in the bank interest rate; as of February 29, the krona will be devalued to 38 to the U.S. dollar from 16 to the dollar.

INDONESIA

Feb. 18—Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev arrives to visit Indonesia.

Feb. 22—President Sukarno, personally escorting Khrushchev on a tour of Indonesia, reaffirms his country's neutrality.

Feb. 24—Khrushchev and Sukarno begin formal talks on international affairs and economic assistance for Indonesia.

Feb. 28—Soviet Premier Khrushchev signs an agreement with Sukarno for a \$250 million Soviet credit. They also sign an agreement for cultural exchanges and a joint statement on international relations.

IRAQ

Feb. 9—Three Iraqi parties are given legal status, denied since the 1958 revolution.

Feb. 16—President Nasser, in a speech in the Syrian sector of the U.A.R., declares that Iraqi Premier Abdul Karim Kassim has forsaken Arab aims to gain Communist support. Nasser challenges Kassim to send his troops to aid in the battle on the Israeli border.

Feb. 28—It is disclosed that on February 23, the Iraqi government turned down the application of the Soviet-approved faction of the Iraqi Communist party to function legally. The dissident Communist group has been recognized.

ISRAEL

Feb. 1—Israeli and Syrian planes clash. In a ground attack, it is reported, Israelis also attacked the Arab village at Tawafik. Premier David Ben-Gurion tells the Israeli parliament that armed force may have to be used to rout Syrians from the demilitarized border area. The Cairo radio announces that U.A.R. forces have been alerted to stand by.

Feb. 2—it is reported that U.N. officials have asked the U.A.R. to withdraw forces from the Israeli-Syrian demilitarized border zone. The armistice agreement of 1949 forbids military installations in the area; however, the U.N. authorities have allowed Israelis and Arabs to cultivate the land that had been theirs. The Israelis claim this border land.

Feb. 4—Israeli and Syrian troops clash in the demilitarized zone in the northeast. Clashes earlier in the week occurred 40 miles to the south of this area.

Feb. 12—Israeli and U.A.R. forces conflict again near Ashmura, on the eastern edge of Lake Hula. Ashmura is in the demilitarized border zone between Syria and Israel. The Israelis claim that U.A.R. troops opened fire while they were on nearby Israeli soil.

Feb. 15—Israel refuses to attend a meeting with Syria arranged by the U.N. mixed armistice commission to discuss their recent conflicts. (See also *International, U.N.*)

Feb. 25—Israel protests to the U.N. Security Council against the U.A.R.'s "policy of active hostility against Israel."

ITALY

Feb. 5—President Giovanni Gronchi departs on a visit to Moscow.

Feb. 9—Gronchi addresses Muscovites over a Soviet television broadcast.

Feb. 11—Gronchi returns to Italy. He is the first chief of state from a Western nation to visit the Soviet Union.

Feb. 21—The National Council of the Liberal party votes against giving further support to the government of Premier Antonio Segni. Christian Democrat Segni, whose minority government needs the Liberals' votes, has said he would resign if the Liberals took such action.

Feb. 24—Segni and his Cabinet unanimously

offer to resign. (There has been no adverse vote in the parliament.) Segni presents the resignation of his government to President Gronchi.

Feb. 26—Gronchi consults with Italian leaders on whether to accept Segni's resignation.

Feb. 29—Cesare Merzagora, President of the Senate, resigns.

JAPAN

Feb. 5—Japan, in a note to the Soviet Union, affirms support of the security treaty signed last month with the U.S. over Soviet protests. Japan criticizes the Soviet Union for its recent statement that it will not turn over control of the Habomai and Shikotan Islands until all foreign troops have been removed from Japanese soil. Such a stipulation was not present in the Soviet-Japanese agreement of 1956.

Feb. 23—A son is born to Crown Prince Akihito and Crown Princess Michiko.

Feb. 29—The new prince is named Naruhito Hironomiya.

KOREA, SOUTH

Feb. 15—Dr. Chough Pyung Ok, chief rival of President Syngman Rhee in the presidential elections scheduled for March 15, dies of a heart attack following surgery at the U.S. Army's Walter Reed Hospital.

Feb. 22—General Carter B. Macgruder, chief of the U.S. Eighth Army, announces that improved and modern weapons will replace those now in use in Korea.

MOROCCO

Feb. 7—King Mohammed V returns to Rabat from a 30-day visit to Middle Eastern countries.

Feb. 15—Morocco cancels its 1956 agreement for "diplomatic cooperation" with France, in protest against the French atomic explosion. Morocco's ambassador to France is recalled.

Feb. 21—in Casablanca, 60,000 Moroccans parade before the French consulate general in disapproval of the French atomic blast.

NEPAL

Feb. 3—Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Kliment Y. Voroshilov arrives on a state visit to Nepal.

NETHERLANDS

Feb. 12—It is announced that the Netherlands will return 30 square miles of frontier territory to West Germany. The land was seized during World War II.

PANAMA

Feb. 2—The U.S. House of Representatives passes a resolution (not mandatory) that the Panamanian flag should not fly over the Panama Canal unless an agreement is reached in a new treaty.

POLAND

Feb. 9—It is announced that yesterday the Polish Central Statistical Bureau reported a 1.3 per cent decline in 1959 for agricultural output.

SPAIN

Feb. 6—Spain announces that 6 American oil companies have been given exploration rights in the Spanish Sahara.

Feb. 20—Police announce that some 100 persons have been arrested because of terrorist bombings during the past two days.

THAILAND

Feb. 8—The Thai King and Queen arrive in Indonesia on a state visit.

TUNISIA

Feb. 5—President Habib Bourguiba modifies his demand for immediate evacuation of the French base at Bizerte.

Feb. 8—Bourguiba withdraws the deadline set for today as the time limit for peaceful agreement on evacuating the Bizerte base.

Feb. 18—Bourguiba states that Muslims must not neglect business and economic interests to pay strict attention to the fast of Ramadan, a month-long religious celebration.

TURKEY

Feb. 20—President Celal Bayar and Foreign Minister Fatin Rustu Zorlu arrive in Pakistan on a visit.

U.S.S.R., THE

Feb. 1—The Soviet Union announces that it fired a second missile into the Pacific target area yesterday.

Feb. 5—Communist leaders from East European satellite countries, meeting in Moscow, issue a declaration that they will sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany if the Berlin problem is not resolved. (See also *International, Berlin Crisis and Warsaw Pact.*)

Feb. 6—Italian President Giovanni Gronchi arrives in Moscow on a state visit.

Feb. 7—It is announced that *Intourist* has informed a New York travel agency that foreign tourists motoring through the Soviet Union will not be supervised or accompanied by Soviet guides.

Igor V. Kurchatov, Soviet scientist and one of the original developers of the Soviet atomic bomb, dies.

Feb. 8—At a reception for the Italian President, Khrushchev and Italian leaders freely exchange their differing views on a Berlin settlement.

Feb. 10—Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev departs on a tour of Southeast Asia.

The Soviet Union and the U.S. agree on a settlement of shipping charges incurred during World War II: the U.S.S.R. agrees to pay \$1,100,000 to the U.S.; the U.S. agrees to drop claims worth some \$7,700,000.

It is disclosed by U.S. officials that the Soviet Union attempted to fire two unsuccessful long-range missiles into the Pacific target area. Tests were detected by U.S. monitor posts.

Feb. 12—A Soviet First Deputy Premier, Anastas I. Mikoyan, tells Cuban officials during his visit there that they can buy planes from the Soviet Union if they so desire. Cuban Premier Fidel Castro asserts that diplomatic ties with the U.S.S.R., broken off since 1952, will be resumed shortly. (See also *Cuba*.)

Feb. 15—Premier Khrushchev, in India, criticizes India's lack of "bitterness" toward the Western colonial powers.

Feb. 17—Khrushchev makes a stopover in Burma en route to Indonesia.

Feb. 20—Twelve Soviet officials leave the U.S. after a 3-week tour.

Feb. 23—*Izvestia*, the Soviet government organ, discloses details of plans to establish in Moscow a university for foreign students, as proposed yesterday by Khrushchev. The new institution will be tuition-free and open to students from overseas,

especially from Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Feb. 11—The National and Mis banks are nationalized.

Feb. 12—A six-man mission, headed by E. Paul Hawk of the U.S. Commerce Department, leaves for the Syrian region of the U.A.R. after a 2-week study of possibilities for American foreign investment in the Egyptian sector. Hawk says that both the U.A.R. and U.S. businessmen would like to have more American capital invested in U.A.R. enterprises.

Feb. 14—The U.A.R. rallies African delegations at the U.N. to protest the French atomic explosion in the Sahara.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser arrives in the Syrian sector of the U.A.R.

Feb. 18—President Nasser opens work on a railway to link Aleppo (a commercial and textile center) with the port of Latakia.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

Feb. 1—The Department of Agriculture estimates that enough soil bank cropland will be retired in 1960 to cut production of surplus grain by 663 million bushels.

Feb. 5—The Department of Agriculture reveals that price support loans will be extended on four surplus grains stored by farmers themselves in local areas for another year.

Feb. 9—President Eisenhower asks Congress for an "economically sound" farm program.

Feb. 26—Final figures for 1959 reveal that farm income dropped 16 per cent below the 1958 level, from \$13 billion to \$11 billion.

Civil Rights

Feb. 14—The discussion of civil rights legislation begins in the Senate.

Feb. 24—Southern Democrat Richard B. Russell opens a fight to delay and obstruct civil rights legislation discussion.

Feb. 26—In a vote of 67-10, the Senate approves continuous 24-hour sessions on the civil rights debate.

Feb. 29—The Senate begins a continuous

session designed to break a Southern civil rights filibuster.

Economy

Feb. 25—The Department of Labor discloses that consumer prices dropped in January for a savings of two cents on every \$10 purchase.

Foreign Policy

Feb. 3—It is revealed in Washington that aid to India will be increased by at least half; additional aid is also planned for Pakistan and perhaps for Taiwan.

Feb. 5—State Department press officer Lincoln White says that the Russian threat of plans for a separate peace treaty with East Germany is not in line with Russian denials of aggressive plans. (See also *International, Berlin Crisis*.)

Feb. 8—Secretary of State Christian Herter says that the U.S.S.R. has taken a stronger stand on the German problem.

Feb. 16—President Eisenhower asks for \$4.175 billion for foreign economic and military aid in fiscal 1961, some \$1 billion more than Congress appropriated in 1960.

Feb. 18—An Executive Order authorizes the Attorney General to confiscate "arms, munitions of war and other articles intended to be or being exported from the United States together with the means used or intended to be used in effectuating the illegal transportation."

The Navy deletes the "Haifa clause" from its oil cargo shipping contracts after protests that the clause in effect forecloses naval contracts with United States shippers trading with Israel. (See *January 21 report*.)

Feb. 21—President Eisenhower says the United States maintains "an indestructible force of incalculable power," as he prepares to start for Latin America tomorrow. (See pages 240-242 of this issue.)

Feb. 22—President Eisenhower arrives in Puerto Rico.

Feb. 23—President Eisenhower and Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek stress the need for economic development for the Western Hemisphere in a joint communique issued at Brasilia.

Feb. 26—The President arrives in Argentina.

Feb. 28—Eisenhower and Argentine President Arturo Frondizi sign the Declaration of San Carlos de Bariloche, pledging their nations to cooperate to raise living standards in all the Americas.

Government (See also *Panama*)

Feb. 1—Federal Communications Commission hearings on radio and television practices end.

Feb. 8—The Civil Aeronautics Board approves a proposed fare increase on some first class and jet service flights.

Feb. 15—Congress completes passage of a \$900 million water pollution control program.

Feb. 16—A federal grand jury in Philadelphia indicts five electrical manufacturers and 18 company officials on criminal anti-trust charges of rigged and collusive bidding. The five concerns are: General Electric, Westinghouse, Allis-Chalmers, I-T-E Circuit Breaker, and Federal Pacific Electric.

President Eisenhower asks for increased postal rates to balance the postal deficit.

Feb. 23—The Civil Aeronautics Board reports that there is evidence a dynamite blast caused the crash of a National Airlines plane near Bolivia, North Carolina, which killed all 34 persons aboard.

Feb. 25—The House of Representatives upholds Eisenhower's veto of the water pollution control program.

Labor

Feb. 3—The Department of Labor reports that dues-paying union membership dropped about 400,000 in the last two years, to a total of some 18 million.

Feb. 18—In letters to Vice-President Richard Nixon and Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, Secretary of Labor James Mitchell withdraws his previous objection to a "modest" increase in the federal minimum wage.

A federal judge dismisses an indictment against former Teamsters Union President Dave Beck. The decision will be appealed by the Department of Justice.

Feb. 24—James R. Hoffa, Teamsters Union president, declares that the union is charged some \$1000 daily for the costs of the 3 court appointed monitors.

Military Policy

Feb. 1—It is reported in Washington that latest U.S. intelligence estimates anticipate at least 150 ICBM's will be operationally ready in 1961.

Feb. 2—The Air Force Titan is fired successfully (using ground guidance and second stage operation) for the first time at Cape Canaveral.

Strategic Air Command Chief Thomas S. Power appeals for a continuous airborne alert.

Feb. 3—at his news conference, the President defends his defense and space policies and criticizes generals who "have all sorts of ideas."

President Eisenhower favors a legislative change allowing United States' allies to receive atomic weapons from the U.S.

Feb. 4—A ninth Discoverer rocket fails to orbit.

Feb. 10—Air Force officials reportedly criticize National Intelligence Board estimates of Russian progress in missiles; Air Force officers believe the Russian lead is greater.

An unidentified satellite is discovered by U.S. tracking stations; it is circling the earth in a near polar orbit.

Feb. 11—The Department of Defense says the unidentified satellite orbiting the earth will remain in orbit for several months.

President Eisenhower says that critics of Administration defense policies are endangering morale.

Feb. 17—The Atomic Energy Commission says that the project to build European atomic power stations sponsored by the U.S. and Euratom has failed.

Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates Jr. apologizes for an Air Force training manual that says communism has infiltrated the nation's churches, and names the National Council of Churches of Christ as Communist-infiltrated. The manual has been withdrawn from use.

At his news conference, the President angrily denies that he has misled the public about United States defenses.

Feb. 18—President Eisenhower names Courtland D. Perkins as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force.

Feb. 19—Defense Secretary Gates orders an

investigation of all service training manuals.

A Discoverer satellite fails to orbit.

Democratic Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri says the Administration has misled the American people with false statements about the state of American defenses.

Feb. 20—A new industrial security program is inaugurated by President Eisenhower by Executive Order; the right of confrontation is now the general rule for accused security risks.

Feb. 21—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration reveals the transfer of \$52.5 million to the Air Force for space projects.

Feb. 22—The N.A.S.A. reveals that the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation has received a \$33.5 million contract for the Mercury man in space project.

Feb. 23—The Department of Defense says that the unidentified satellite may be a recovery capsule from a Discoverer rocket.

Feb. 24—An Air Force Titan is successfully launched from Cape Canaveral and carries a data capsule more than 5000 miles to its target.

Feb. 25—Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Arthur Flemming reveals that the radiation safety standard for humans over a lifetime has been reduced by almost half.

Feb. 26—The first Air Force Midas "early warning" satellite fails to orbit.

Feb. 27—It is reported in Washington that Secretary Gates has set up a small research force to gather information for officials and others who want "an accurate understanding of our defense situation." His memorandum is dated February 17.

Politics

Feb. 2—Vice-President Richard Nixon allows his name to be entered in the Indiana Republican presidential primary.

Feb. 16—It is announced that Nixon will enter the Wisconsin presidential preference primary.

Feb. 23—It is announced that Senator Wayne Morse will not enter the Wisconsin primary.

Representative Chester Bowles of Connecticut is named to advise John F.

Kennedy on foreign policy in the campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Segregation

Feb. 12—Negro student demonstrations against segregated lunch counter facilities spread in South Carolina. Demonstrations began February 2 in North Carolina.

Feb. 16—Negro protests against segregated lunch counter facilities touch off riots at Portsmouth, Virginia.

Feb. 20—Sitdown protests against segregated lunch counter facilities continue in Richmond, Virginia.

Feb. 24—Violence continues for the second day over Negro sitdown protests at lunch facilities in Chattanooga, Tennessee.

Supreme Court

Feb. 23—The Supreme Court reverses the convictions of Arkansas leaders of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; two officials had refused to disclose names of members.

The Court rules that the National Labor Relations Board cannot hold that a partial strike or "harassing activities" during negotiations are a refusal to bargain in good faith.

Feb. 29—The Court rules that a state or local government may dismiss employees for security reasons.

The Court votes unanimously to reverse a lower court decision holding unconstitutional an important part of the 1957 Civil Rights Act.

The Court rules that a manufacturer who tries to maintain fixed retail prices for his products violates the Sherman Anti-trust Act. The case concerns Parke, Davis and Company.

YUGOSLAVIA

Feb. 10—Alojzije Cardinal Stepinac, who was tried and convicted for war crimes in 1946, dies.

Feb. 16—In a speech by Vladimir Bakaric, Communist chief of Croatia, made public today, it is revealed that Bakaric has hinted at a change in church-state relations. He asserts that religion is a personal matter, to be excluded from politics.

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